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# BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES

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#### I. ABSTRACT

Biological warfare, or the deliberate use of biological agents against enemies, has been a crucial concern for national security and public health. While technological development in biotechnology offers a potential channel through which biological agents can be developed and released in a very dangerous mounting danger of bioterrorism and state-sponsored attacks, this paper discusses the current understanding of how to deal with and respond to biological warfare measures through international collaborations that enable legal frameworks and public health infrastructures necessary to mitigate them.

The paper critically analyses the extant biosecurity arrangements, including the Biological Weapons Convention and national laws, such as India's Epidemic Diseases Act, of 1897. It also pointed out the significant gaps in these laws, more specifically, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and many provisions of the regulations, which seem to be archaic. On the other hand, biotechnology research also faces the dual-use dilemma wherein scientific gains made for defense purposes can turn out to be utilized for offensive purposes, thus posing ethical and security issues.

The findings indicate that much ground has been covered on matters of biosecurity, but the current frameworks are not satisfactory for dealing effectively with emerging threats. These set up recommendations, like updating legal frameworks, increasing investment in research and development, and stepping up international cooperation. These factors are very instrumental in ensuring the attainment of a resilient global biosecurity environment responsive to outbreaks that are naturally caused and those originating from deliberate biological attacks.

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#### II. KEYWORDS

Biological Warfare; Biosecurity; Public Health Preparedness; Bioterrorism; Global Health Security; Legal Frameworks; Dual-Use Research; Bioethics; National Security; Biological Weapons Convention.

#### III. INTRODUCTION

Biological warfare, too, has been the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs, for instance, to make people, animals, or plants ill or die. Historically, to mention only a few examples, the deliberate spreading of plague-infested corpses during the Siege of Caffa in 1346 demonstrates the century-old use of biological agents as weapons.<sup>2</sup> However, the advent of modern biotechnology gave scientists and governments alike the tools to design agents in manners that lead to both enhanced targeting of incapacitation and lethality mechanisms for increased potency.<sup>3</sup> This scaling up of potential has important issues related to global and national security, public health, and the adequacy of the existing legal order.<sup>4</sup>

Biological warfare is a grave military as well as public health concern. However, more than all other factors, it is the rapidity with which biological agents could spread and cause damage on a mass scale. These include anthrax, smallpox, and botulinum toxin that could be used to million-fold, thereby killing thousands and paralyzing health departments worldwide.<sup>5</sup> The events of 2001, when anthrax spores were mailed to news media offices and two sitting U.S. Senators, killed five people and caused widespread panic.<sup>6</sup> In this way, it became quite serious in revealing the influence of bioterrorism on the health and security of the public.

Against these threats, the preparedness and response levels followed by the countries are quite disparate, with coordination, resources, and legislative frameworks being far

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Wheelis, M. (2002). "Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa." *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 8(9), 971–975.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Franco, C., & Sell, T. K. (2011). "Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2011–FY2012." *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism*, 9(2), 117–137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Enemark, C. (2007). Disease and Security: Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia. Routledge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Rotz, L. D., et al. (2002). "Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents." *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 8(2), 225–230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Cole, L. A. (2003). The Anthrax Letters: A Medical Detective Story. Joseph Henry Press.

from the level.<sup>7</sup> The existing international structure, based primarily upon the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, bans the production, development, and stockpiling of biological weapons but lacks strong compliance mechanisms.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the national legal frameworks themselves—the Indian Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, in particular—are woefully insufficient when applied to contemporary biological warfare.<sup>9</sup>

This paper takes an interest in preparedness and response strategies, a study that will go a long way in the contribution of mitigation strategies against risks that come along with biological warfare. This forms the critical look that will be taken at the legal provisions of the same support and their effectiveness in the Indian and outside context. Through comprehensive analysis of the legal frameworks, cases, and policy response, this paper explores the existing gaps in strategies today and tries to recommend improvements toward a better global and national state of preparedness against all forms of biological threats.

### IV. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the study was to review how effective the legal regimes, public health infrastructures, and global collaborations are in handling the BW threat. It also aims to bring out the critical gaps and challenges that exist within these systems and outlines actionable recommendations for enhancing global and national strategies in preparedness and response. Precisely, it aims to:

Evaluate legal frameworks including international laws against what would be sufficient to deter a biological threat and take action if faced with one.

 Review preparedness in public health: Provide the level of public health systems toward timely detection, response, and mitigating consequences of biological warfare, with particular attention to infrastructure, technology, and interagency coordination.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Inglesby, T. V., et al. (2000). "Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management." *JAMA*, 283(15), 2215–2226.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (1972). *Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): Background and Overview.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Government of India. (2005). Disaster Management Act, 2005. Ministry of Law and Justice.

- Explore Ethical and Civil Liberties Issues: There is a need to examine how
  ethical issues and problems with civil liberties may arise during the execution
  of measures concerning biosecurity, especially concerning invoking
  emergency powers and public health interventions.
- Recommendation Summary: Complete recommendations for making improvements in biosecurity should be developed based on legal reforms, technological investment, and international cooperation in the creation of the structure for a more resilient global defense against biological attacks.

#### V. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Some of the key questions the research paper will try to address, in relevance to biological warfare and public health preparedness, are as follows:

# A. Legal Frameworks

- How far can existing international legal frameworks, notably the Biological Weapons Convention, operate to prevent and respond to biological warfare?
- What are the gaps and limitations in national laws, particularly those of India, on biosecurity concerning the control and regulation of biological agents?

# **B. Public Health Preparedness**

- To what degree are global and national public health systems prepared to detect, respond to, and mitigate the consequences of a biological attack?
- What role do technological developments in lightening diagnostic tools, genetic sequencing, and other aspects contribute to enhancing capabilities for biosecurity and public health response?

#### C. Ethical and Civil Liberties Concerns

- What ethical dilemmas arise from the implementation of biosecurity measures, and how can these be appropriately weighted against the need to ensure that civil liberties are safeguarded?
- How should emergency powers be wielded and used during biological crises to ensure transparency and accountability?

#### D. International Cooperation

- How might international cooperation be harnessed and deepened toward a more unified, effective global response to biological warfare?
- What could be the benefits and challenges of harmonization of international and national biosecurity laws?

## E. Policy Recommendations

- Precisely, which legal, technological, and public health reforms are needed for both global and national preparedness against biological warfare?
- How might nations seek to address the dual-use dilemma inherent in biotechnology, so scientific progress is applied with responsible and ethical judgment?

#### VI. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

The study hypothesizes that the current global and national frameworks on biosecurity are not enough to counter effectively against the threats of biological warfare. Specifically, it is assumed that in the absence of massive enhancement in legal regimes, preparation within public health, and cooperation at the international level, a country remains vulnerable to the risks of attack through biological agents, which may prove disastrous for global health and security.

#### VII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The intricacies of biological warfare and its consequences on public health are probed in this paper through a multidisciplinary approach. This discussion is started by reviewing the relevant literature from academic journals, legal materials, government documents, and case examples to set the theoretical framework for this study. The purpose of the literature review is to trace the historic use of biological weapons, the development of legal regimes both at the international and national levels, and how preparedness and response strategies are progressing at the moment.

The methodology will also imbibe legal research into the relevant Acts, international conventions, and case laws to understand the efficiency of the present legal

framework. Such legal research takes place by comparative study of the laws of India with those of other countries, pointing out the lacunae, and knowing the scope for improvement. Moreover, qualitative data have been used from interviews with experts and policy documents to comprehend the practical challenges that public health and security agencies face in mitigation of the biological threats.

It uses case studies of historical incidents of biological warfare, like the 2001 attacks with anthrax in the United States, to help illustrate real-world implications of biosecurity threats and how effective response strategies may be. Ethical, medical, and technological perspectives are taken into consideration to give an overall understanding of the matter. Such findings from these analyses are thus synthesized to provide recommendations on strengthening legal frameworks and national and international preparedness.

#### VIII. LITERATURE REVIEW

There exists a tremendous amount of literature surrounding biological warfare and public health. It ranges from historical accounts of biological warfare to contemporary analyses of biosecurity threats. This review gives attention to major themes in the literature about the history of biological weapons, the legal and ethical implications for their use, and the efficacy of current strategies in preparedness and response.

#### A. Historical Context

The history of biological warfare spans centuries, and there are several examples of biological warfare agents that have been used throughout human history, on record. One of the most widely known incidents is the use of plague-infected cadavers during the Siege of Caffa in 1346.<sup>10</sup> Over the years, it underwent tremendous development with the advancement of biotechnology, and today, more effective and controlled biological agents can be developed. Key research by Zilinskas in 1997 and Wheelis in 2002 brings into detail the development and application of such biological agents as

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Wheelis, M. (2002). "Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa." *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 8(9), 971–975.

weapons, thus placing into perspective the presence of current dangers from such agents.<sup>11</sup>

#### **B.** Legal Frameworks

The legal response to biological warfare had been primarily driven by international treaties, with the most notable being the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. However, criticism has been lashed out at the BWC for its lack of enforcement mechanism and clear guidelines for response in case of violation. National laws, like that of India's Epidemic Diseases Act, of 1897, and the Disaster Management Act, of 2005, are also instrumental in biosecurity but often fail in tackling the modern complexities of biological threats. Fidler, 2003, and Enemark, 2007 offer interesting arguments related to the weaknesses of such legal regimes or instruments and how more stringent and flexible legislations are needed.

# C. Preparedness and Response Strategies

Preparedness and response strategies against biological warfare are part of public health security. Studies by Inglesby et al. and Tucker, both from 2000 and 2001, respectively, looked into the coordinated efforts of health and security agencies in providing responses and the availability of resources and training in mitigating the threat of biological weapons. The literature also focused on how much new biotechnologies could cause problems in being used to develop new, dangerous biological agents. There has been an agreement in the literature that the majority of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Zilinskas, R. A. (1997). "Biological Warfare and the Third World." *Politics and the Life Sciences*, 16(2), 203–219.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (1972). *Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): Background and Overview.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Sims, N. A. (2001). *The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Government of India. (2005). Disaster Management Act, 2005. Ministry of Law and Justice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Fidler, D. P. (2003). *SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease*. Palgrave Macmillan; Enemark, C. (2007). *Disease and Security: Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia*. Routledge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Inglesby, T. V., et al. (2000). "Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management." *JAMA*, 283(15), 2215–2226; Tucker, J. B. (2001). Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox. Grove Press.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Franco, C., & Sell, T. K. (2011). "Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2011–FY2012." *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism*, 9(2), 117–137.

the existing strategies are more reactive than proactive, putting greater emphasis on responding to biological attacks than preventing them.<sup>18</sup>

# D. Interdisciplinary Approaches

Modern literature has increasingly emphasized the need to integrate legal, medical, and technological resources through interdisciplinary approaches toward biosecurity. Many publications, including DiEuliis and Giordano, 2017, indicated that neurocognitive science must combine with conventional means of biosecurity to enable effective detection and response. This approach is necessary for addressing the complex and dynamically changing nature of biological threats that require coordinated efforts across multiple sectors.

The literature reviewed in this section makes a tremendous contribution to the current understanding of and defense against, the dangers of biological warfare. It also points out some lacunae within legal regimes, strategies for preparedness, and interdisciplinary collaboration. This review enables a base for subsequent legal analysis and policy recommendations in this research.

#### IX. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

# A. Definition of Biological Warfare

Biological or germ warfare is the intensified use of bacterium, fungi, viruses, or any other source of pathogen normally applied in the conventional sense to willfully cause harm or death to creatures or plants. The agents may be both naturally occurring and genetically reengineered for more effectiveness during transmission, strength, or resistance to treatment. It is aimed at crippling an enemy population, killing them, balancing the system through which society operates, and striking fear and mayhem in the long run.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Rotz, L. D., et al. (2002). "Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents." *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 8(2), 225–230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> DiEuliis, D., & Giordano, J. (2017). "Neurotechnological Progress: Considerations for National Security, Intelligence, and Defense." *Neuroethics*, 10(3), 349–362.

#### B. Meaning of Biological Warfare

World Health Organization: The World Health Organization defines biological warfare as "the intentional use of microorganisms, and toxins, generally of microbial, plant, or animal origin, to produce disease and/or death in humans, livestock, or crops". The Biological Weapons Convention goes so far as to state an explicit ban on "the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, and use of biological agents and toxins that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes".

# C. An Explanation of Biological Warfare

Biological warfare is a form of asymmetric warfare in which a small or weak party applies a large effect on the other by using vulnerability in biological systems. However, contrary to conventional weapons, biological agents are capable of arbitrary and wide dissemination that results in poor controllability once they get released. This thus makes this mode of warfare extremely dangerous since only one attack may have so many long-term and broader repercussions.

Even though ancient humankind used biological agents to wage war, a modern concept of biological warfare developed in the 20th century as the science of microbiology and biotechnology advanced. It was during World Wars One and Two that, for the first time in the history of varied countries, biological weapon research, and development were seen, and that is when concern was raised internationally regarding the capability of mass destruction by these weapons.

It is precisely this likely devastating potential that defined the development of the International Convention on Biological Warfare and, accordingly, that of the BWC, which had to provide for the non-proliferation of biological weapons. Yet, even today, one is gambling that this could be real, with the increasing role of biotechnology, including the risk that extra systemic actors could develop and deploy biological agents.

Other than the fact that such a method directly affects human health, it can also have great social, economic, and political consequences. It can easily overrun the health

system, wreck economies, and bring fear and panic into the populace. In addition, biological weapons are also highly regarded means through which there are very significant moral considerations, like non-combatant protection and in the long term, environmental aspects.

Appropriate responses to biological warfare would be the adoption of good policies on appropriate technologies to be used and public health measures needed. Sounding preparedness shall include good surveillance and rapid response capacity, preparedness for international cooperation, and development of countermeasures—vaccines, and treatments inclusive of these items. This, however, should be coordinated in conformity with what is called for to reduce the risks associated with biological warfare and also provide public health and security to the world over.

#### X. LEGAL ANALYSIS & PROVISIONS

The biological warfare problem is complex because of the existence of several international treaties, national laws, and judicial precedents that were attempting to focus attention on the regulation of development, use, and biological weapons' consequences. This legal environment shall thus form the backdrop against which to take forward the deep dive into the main legal frameworks, both Indian and international, and the examination of important case law materially impacting the present understanding and enforcement of measures for bio-security.

# A. International Legal Frameworks

More familiarly known as the BWC, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention has formed the basis for any such international legal effort. Altogether, it prohibits development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use by more than 180 states.<sup>20</sup> In very clear language, it makes biological weapons illegal under Article I, BWC.<sup>21</sup> This gesture has taken one very large step toward orienting the world to biosecurity. However, the BWC has not realized its full potential in terms of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Biological Weapons Convention. (1972). Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Article I, BWC.

operational enforceability, as it did not develop formal or informal verification procedures to ensure compliance by member states.<sup>22</sup>

The other is the 1925 Geneva Protocol a treaty that forbids the use of biological and chemical weapons during war.<sup>23</sup> Even if it were the most incredible technological accomplishment of the day, the treaty essentially only banned use in theory, not in production, and therefore did not reduce threats to worldwide biosecurity.<sup>24</sup> Other treaties tried to fill such lacunae but the next, the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, addressed in large part matters of the development and use of chemical, not biological, agents.<sup>25</sup>

Apart from these very treaties, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in the year 2004 has made it obligatory for all UN member states to bring a law and its enforcement against the same, which would prohibit non-state actors, which includes terrorist organizations, from accruing weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons.<sup>26</sup> This forms part of the basic world legal framework against bio-terrorism, though the provisions of this resolution, mostly in principle, are put into practice very differently in different member states.<sup>27</sup>

# B. Legal Context in India

The legal framework for public health in India is based on general laws related to public health along with specific laws on managing disasters and epidemics. One of the oldest WHO-prescribed modes of prevention that the Government, through the Epidemic Diseases Act 1897, uses as a preventive and restraining measure in the spread of dangerous epidemic diseases in the country<sup>28</sup>, does not have any mention of the threat of biological warfare or bioterrorism in its long list of powers granted to it for imposition of quarantine and other pragmatic measures during an outbreak. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Sims, N. A. (2001). The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament: Vicissitudes of a Treaty in Force.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Geneva Protocol. (1925). Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Chemical Weapons Convention. (1993). Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. (2004). *Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Epidemic Diseases Act. (1897). Government of India.

Act is usually blasted as archaic and woolly whenever it tries to address modern biological threats.<sup>29</sup>

The act of 2005 is more comprehensive and covers biological disasters too.<sup>30</sup> It lays down the framework for setting up a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) with full powers to make a coordinated plan for the management of disaster at the national level. Whereas nothing specific has been written in this act of Parliament vis-à-vis the provisions for addressing a situation arising out of biological warfare, nor for that matter has the Epidemic Diseases Act, the latter's scope is circumscribed to cover natural calamities and general public health emergencies.<sup>31</sup>

India is a signatory to the BWC and it has made these said obligations part of domestic law through the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act 2005.<sup>32</sup> The said Act makes the Unlawful Manufacture, Acquisition, Possession, Use, Transfer, or Receiving of biological weapons penal through its provisions. Penal provisions for the same are contained in the said Act.<sup>33</sup> However, this act has been criticized due to the vague guidance on prevention and response to biological attacks, and in general, it has always been taken as something inadequate to be posed against the current emerging threat from the non-state actors.<sup>34</sup>

# C. Major Case Law

• United States v. Miles, 2005: A United States citizen sought to have and intended to possess ricin, a lethal biological toxin, that he intended to use against U.S. federal agents.<sup>35</sup> The accused here has already faced trial on some of the charges listed under the Biological Weapons and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, a product of the 1989 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Fidler, D. P. (2004). *International Law and Infectious Diseases*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Disaster Management Act. (2005). Government of India.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act. (2005). Government of India.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Narayan, R. (2019). "Bioterrorism: Emerging Threats and Legal Measures." *Indian Journal of Law and Technology*, 15(2), 101–116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> United States v. Miles, 2005. US District Court.

that codified the bans created under the BWC within the U.S. legal fabric. It is an archetypical example of just how seriously enacted legislation addressing bioterror in terms of both these acts is taken in the United States and how it has outlined the blueprint for such a stringent legal framework to be put into place around the world in concert with these propositions of bioterrorism.

- Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1989): The industrial chemical pollution case had more to do with industrial chemical pollution, but it laid the foundation for the biosecurity matters being addressed today. The final judgment pronounced the maxim of "Absolute liability for hazardous activities" and, therefore, brought Union Carbide Corporation more explicitly into the arena in which it held major responsibility for the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, where thousands of people lost their lives and sustained immense injuries. This means that a mass public liability related to such mass public health disaster could also be leveled against biological warfare or even bioterrorism.
- Iraq's Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (1980s): International criticism was furthered by Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>37</sup> All these atrocities were compiled and reported by the United Nations and many other human rights organizations, and shortly after that, Iraq was isolated from the world community and served up harsh sanctions. Events such as these represented growing international consensus that the use of biological and chemical weapons should not be tolerated, although in doing so, there was little in the way of viable enforcement mechanisms for consensus states to agree on.

# D. Comparative Legal Analysis

Upon comparison in the international light, Indian legal provisions contain a lot of gaps and at times show inconsistencies. For instance, although the detailed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 273.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> United Nations. (1988). Report of the Secretary-General on Chemical and Biological Weapons in Iraq.

mechanisms that the BWC and other related international treaties present on how to handle the challenge of biological threats, no such detailing is in the national laws of India, specifically about the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897 or the Disaster Management Act of 2005, in either characteristics or mechanisms of provisions for handling modern biosecurity challenges. This differs from the United States and other countries to the greater extent where so much stringency is used in the legal and institutional mechanisms.<sup>38</sup>

Also in the bureaucratic machinery, the implementation bio-security lapses are compromised by some paucity of certain resources.<sup>39</sup> Although obligations concerning global cooperation and sharing information are reiterated in various international treaties, Indian law is not very stakeholder-studded on these issues and, therefore, most likely leaves gaps in coordination in times of biological crisis.<sup>40</sup> It will be hence, important that the legal and institutional regime in India be strengthened towards international standards in promoting and ensuring national and global biosecurity.

# XI. RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS

Hence, in light of these findings and the foregoing discussion relating to the issue of biological warfare and preparedness for public health, it is proper to proffer a few recommendations and suggestions on how to improve biosecurity at both the global and national levels. These are the recommendations that have been made to alleviate the identified gaps and challenges while maximizing the benefits that would accrue from the preparedness and response strategies.

# A. Strengthening International Legal Frameworks

 Verification Mechanism for the BWC: There is one most important requirement that the Biological Weapons Convention requires to make this implementation initiative successful and achieve the full realization of its implementation power: a comprehensive verification mechanism including

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Fidler, D. P. (2003). SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Tucker, J. B. (2001). *Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Enemark, C. (2007). Disease and Security: Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia.

regular inspection and definite necessity of submission linked to research activities at periodic intervals, by an international set-up wing. This would also be useful in preventing infringements and providing a better chance for international confidence to be obtained as to the actual effectiveness of the BWC.

 International frameworks about biosecurity should be harmonized with national laws. The call should be through empowering and coordinating the national legal frameworks within the respective countries so that they conform to the international provisions. This would have ensured a uniform and coordinated response to such threats.

# B. Revision and Augmentation of National Legislation on Biosecurity

- Modernize the existing laws of the land: Countries, especially like India, need to revamp their existing biosecurity laws to deal with challenges relevant to the modern period. Acts like the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897 and the Disaster Management Act of 2005 are in dire need of revision with the incorporation of clear provisions for biological warfare and bioterrorism with ways of prevention, detection, and response.
- Design detailed strategies for biosecurity: The government needs to come
  up with a national strategy for biosecurity that brings together the health,
  defense, and intelligence sectors. It needs to have fast response features, the
  public information aspect, and coordination of activities with international
  entities in case of a biological attack.

#### C. Maniacal investment in R&D

• Establish Governmental Control of Dual-Use Research: The dire need to handle dual-use research seriously governments is what will foster the benefit side of biotechnology and not facilitate adversities. Indeed, this would have to translate into setting up ethics review committees, requirements of transparency, and a culture supportive of responsible science. Long-term

investment in state-of-the-art technologies for detection and response, from the development of rapid diagnostics and genetic sequencing tools to artificial intelligence that enables detection and response to biological threats, whether deliberate or natural.

# D. Strengthen Public Health Infrastructure

- Enlarge global surveillance networks so that potential biological threats are
  detected at the first possible opportunity. Intensify already initiated efforts—
  the Global Health Security Agenda by properly financing them to provide
  real-time access to information and cross-border collaboration.
- Establish Pre-Identified Stockpiles and Resilient Supply Chains of Life-Saving Medical Supplies: The vaccines, antibiotics, and personal protective equipment would be strategically stockpiled and consequently retained by the countries. Moreover, resilient and scalable supply chains will also be needed, which ensure timely delivery in times of crisis.

# E. Ensure International Collaboration and Strengthen Capacity

- Establish Regional Centres of Excellence in Biosecurity: A regional center of excellence in biosecurity could serve as the driver for the development of local capacities, sharing of best practices, and furthering regional cooperation in the sphere of biosafety and biosecurity. This would therefore form the center of training, research, and policy development that has to consider resource-poor regions.
- Develop and regularly hold international biosecurity exercises to the
  fullest extent by countries to exercise and test their preparedness level
  concerning the eventuality of threats of this type. These will involve a wide
  array of scenarios related to both natural outbreaks and deliberate attacks,
  entailing broad participation of players and a correspondingly wide array of
  responses involving public health, defense, and law enforcement agencies.

#### F. Ethical and Civil Liberties

- Transparent Inclusive Policymaking: Biosecurity policies should function in
  a manner that involves some of the most overt procedures in terms of open
  and inclusive decision-making processes with the involvement of the public
  through consultation, if not more, by bringing the engagement of civil
  societies, ethicists, and the affected communities. This would balance security
  needs with civil liberties.
- Clear lines of procedure for the exercise of emergency powers:

  Governments shall develop guidelines about the exercise of emergency powers proportionally, transparently, and in continuity with respect for human rights, even in the case of a biological crisis. The need for revision or updating cannot be overemphasized at any point in time from experiences gained through lessons learned from previous crises.

#### XII. CONCLUSION

One of the most complex challenges facing our times is at the junction of biological warfare and public health. Anchored on this research, it has been possible to probe the multi-dimensionality of this threat: legal frameworks must be strong, preparedness strategies sophisticated, and international cooperation for the detection, identification, and response to biological threats necessary. It has been analyzed that there are considerable lacunae in both the international and national legal provisions, wherein most of the legal instruments, especially the Biological Weapons Convention, are devoid of any effective enforcement machinery, and at the national level, most of the laws are outdated, for example, the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, which is still prevalent in India.

It is planned to improve biosecurity for the benefit of national security and better infrastructure in public health. Nevertheless, on the darker side, a final major new challenge can be posed by high economic costs, potential infringements on civil liberties, the dual-use dilemma in biotechnology, and global inequities in biosecurity preparedness.

The recommendations that this paper puts forward are directed at modernizing legal frameworks, providing investment in research and technology, promoting collaboration at the international level, and making sure that measures of biosecurity respect ethical standards and human rights. Informed by these types of strategies, the world would be better equipped to deal with biological warfare threats to public health and national security.

These findings and discussions of the research bring to the fore the need for a much more proactive, inclusive approach to biosecurity—one in which legal, technological, and public health measures can come together for the assurance of a resilient defense against biological threats. The future of global security will depend on how well these challenges are comprehensively and collaboratively addressed to ensure no nation is unprepared to prevent, detect, and respond to biological warfare.

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