



LAWFOYER INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DOCTRINAL LEGAL RESEARCH

[ISSN: 2583-7753]

Volume 4 | Issue 3

2026

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.350>

© 2026 LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research

Follow this and additional research works at: www.lijdlr.com

Under the Platform of LawFoyer – www.lawfoyer.in

After careful consideration, the editorial board of LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research has decided to publish this submission as part of the publication.

In case of any suggestions or complaints, kindly contact (info.lijdlr@gmail.com)

To submit your Manuscript for Publication in the LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, To submit your Manuscript [Click here](#)

THE LAW WE FEAR, THE LAW WE BELIEVE: WHAT REALLY CONTROLS US?

Mahalakshmi B¹

I. ABSTRACT

The question of why people should obey the law remains one of the central and continuing problems in jurisprudence and political philosophy. Obedience raises not only the question whether a rule is legally valid, but also whether citizens owe a moral duty to follow it. This paper examines why people obey law by separating legal validity from moral obligation. The paper discusses the major theories that have attempted to explain why people obey the law, including natural law, social contract theory, utilitarianism and legal positivism. It gives particular attention to H.L.A. Hart's theory of legal obligation, especially his distinction between being "obliged" and being "under an obligation", the internal point of view, and the practice theory of rules. Hart connects legal obligation with the acceptance of rules as standards of conduct within a legal system, yet he does not argue that a valid law automatically creates a moral duty to obey it. The paper then considers Hart's idea of the minimum content of natural law and its practical importance for maintaining social order, security and cooperation. It examines the views of Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller to show different approaches to legal authority, legality and fidelity to law. The paper finally addresses the difficult issue of civil disobedience, particularly where valid laws are regarded as unjust. The examples of Gandhi's Salt Satyagraha and Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights movement demonstrate that obedience to law may come into conflict with moral conscience. The paper concludes that no single reason applies in every situation, and that the duty to obey law depends upon the relationship between legal validity, social order, moral responsibility and the principles of justice.

II. KEYWORDS

¹ Third Year student B.A.LL.B., KMC College of Law, Tirupur, Affiliated with The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Tamil Nadu (India). Email: authormahalakshmib@gmail.com

Obedience to Law; Legal Obligation; Legal Positivism; H.L.A. Hart; Civil Disobedience.

III. INTRODUCTION

Why should a citizen obey the law? This question sits at the meeting point of political philosophy and jurisprudence, for it asks not what the law *is* but what claim the law has on our conduct once we know what it is. A purely descriptive account of law, such as H.L.A. Hart's positivism,² might seem to have little to say about obligation, since Hart insists that the identification of law is a separate question from its moral merit. Yet Hart's work contains one of the most influential modern accounts of legal obligation:³ his "practice theory", grounded in the internal point of view, and his broader positivist framework have shaped how later theorists, from Joseph Raz to John Rawls, have approached the question of why citizens should, or need not, obey the law. This essay examines the major jurisprudential answers to the obedience question, develops Hart's distinctive contribution in detail, and evaluates its strengths and limits, including the hard case of civil disobedience.

A. Research Problem

Legal theory has not settled whether the validity of a law, by itself, supplies a citizen with a reason to obey it. Positivist accounts explain what makes a rule binding within a legal system but stop short of showing why a subject ought morally to comply, while natural law and social contract accounts supply a moral reason at the cost of blurring the distinction between law and morality. That gap becomes acute when a valid law is seriously unjust, and it is this gap which the present study seeks to examine.

B. Research Objectives

1. To trace the underlying reasons that lead individuals to accept, follow and remain committed to the law in a society.

² H.L.A. Hart, *Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals*, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 593-94 (1958).

³ H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* 82-91 (2nd ed, Clarendon Press 1994).

2. To explore the distinction between the existence of a valid law and the question of whether such a law deserves obedience.
3. To understand H.L.A. Hart's approach to legal obligation, particularly through his concepts of the internal point of view and the practice theory of rules.
4. To examine how different schools of jurisprudence provide different explanations for obedience, ranging from morality and social agreement to social welfare and legal authority.
5. To check whether being legally bound is necessarily the same as having a moral reason to obey the law.
6. To understand the limits of obedience by examining the relationship between law, morality and civil disobedience in situations involving unjust laws.

C. Research Questions

1. Why do different Jurisprudential theories arrive at different explanations for obedience to law?
2. What makes people recognize a legal rule as something that ought to be followed, rather than merely something backed by the threat of punishment?
3. When a citizen deliberately disobeys an unjust law, is the conflict between law and morality unavoidable, or can jurisprudence provide a way to understand it?
4. Where does the obligation to obey law become difficult to maintain when the law conflicts with morality or Justice?
5. Does the legal validity of a rule, by itself, provide a sufficient reason for a citizen to obey it?
6. Can the need for social order, security and cooperation provide an independent reason for generally following the law?

D. Research Methodology

The present research adopts a doctrinal research methodology. The study is primarily based on the analysis and interpretation of existing legal and Jurisprudential materials rather than empirical or field-based data. The research examines the concept of obedience to law through the writings and theories of major Jurisprudential thinkers, with particular attention to H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, Lon Fuller, John Rawls and other relevant scholars. The primary sources of the research include books, judicial decisions, legal principles and relevant legal materials, while secondary sources include research articles, journals, commentaries and scholarly writings on legal obligation, legal authority, morality and civil disobedience.

The research follows a qualitative and analytical approach, comparing different theories to understand why individuals may regard law as binding and whether such legal obligation necessarily amounts to a moral duty to obey. Particular emphasis is placed on Hart's internal point of view and practice theory of rules, along with the contrasting perspectives of natural law, legal positivism, Raz's service conception and Fuller's inner morality of law. The study also uses selected instances of civil disobedience, including Gandhi's Salt Satyagraha and Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights movement, to examine the difficult situation in which obedience to law comes into conflict with morality and justice.

The research ultimately seeks to understand the obedience question not merely as "Why do people follow the law?", but as the deeper Jurisprudential question of "When, and for what reasons, should people obey the law?"

E. Research Hypothesis

The present research proceeds on the hypothesis that obedience to law is better understood as a relationship between legal obligation and moral responsibility, particularly when a valid law conflicts with principles of justice.

F. Literature Review

The question of obedience to law has occupied an important place in jurisprudential thought because law does not merely regulate conduct through rules and sanctions; it also claims a certain authority over those who are subject to it. The existing literature approaches this question from different perspectives, including the nature of legal obligation, morality, authority, social cooperation and justice. A review of these approaches helps to understand why obedience cannot be explained through a single theory.

John Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* (1832). Austin explains law primarily in terms of the commands of a sovereign backed by sanctions.⁴ From this perspective, obedience is closely connected with the habitual obedience of individuals to the sovereign. Austin's approach is significant because it places authority and coercion at the centre of the discussion, although it has been questioned for its ability to explain why people continue to regard rules as binding even when immediate threats or sanctions are absent.

H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (1961). Hart develops a more detailed account of legal obligation.⁵ He distinguishes between a person being "obliged" to do something because of a threat and being "under an obligation" because a rule is accepted as a standard of conduct. His concept of the internal point of view explains how individuals within a legal system may regard rules as standards that ought to guide behaviour, so that his practice theory moves the discussion away from mere fear of punishment towards the social acceptance and operation of rules. Hart also separates legal validity from moral evaluation, since a rule may be legally valid even when people consider it morally wrong. That separation leaves open the further question of whether a legally valid rule necessarily creates a moral duty to comply, and it therefore supplies an analytical

⁴ John Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* 18-30 (1832).

⁵ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 82-91.

framework rather than a simple moral command to obey.

Lon L. Fuller, *The Morality of Law* (1964). In *The Morality of Law*, Fuller develops the relationship between legality and morality through his idea of the inner morality of law.⁶ He identifies principles such as generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, prospectivity and stability as essential features of a functioning legal order. His approach suggests that law creates a relationship of reciprocity between the state and the citizen, so that when a government fails to govern through understandable and reasonably consistent rules, the basis for fidelity to law becomes weaker.

Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (1986). Raz carries the discussion further through his service conception of authority, whose normal justification thesis he sets out in *The Morality of Freedom*.⁷ According to Raz, the authority of law is connected with its ability to help individuals conform better to reasons that already apply to them. His work is significant because it challenges the idea that every valid law automatically creates a general moral duty of obedience. The justification of legal authority instead depends upon the relationship between the law, the reasons for action and the individual subject.

John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1971). In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls examines obedience through the ideas of justice, fairness and civil disobedience.⁸ He recognises that citizens generally have reasons to maintain a reasonably just political system, while also acknowledging that serious injustice can provide grounds for conscientious political opposition. This perspective is useful in understanding why obedience and resistance cannot always be treated as complete opposites.

Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the social contract tradition (1651–1762). These thinkers connect political obligation with the relationship between

⁶ Lon L. Fuller, *The Morality of Law* 33-39 (Yale University Press 1964).

⁷ Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* 53 (Clarendon Press 1986).

⁸ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* 333-55 (Harvard University Press 1971). All citations to *A Theory of Justice* in this paper are to the original 1971 edition.

individuals and the political community.⁹ Law can be viewed as part of the framework through which security, cooperation and social order are maintained. At the same time, the different versions of social contract theory raise questions about the limits of political authority and the circumstances in which resistance may become justified.

Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789). Bentham considers obedience in terms of its consequences for society.¹⁰ A stable system of law can promote security, predictability and social welfare, while widespread disregard for legal rules may create uncertainty and disorder. This approach therefore provides a practical reason for general obedience, although it also raises the question whether social welfare alone can justify obedience to an individual law that causes serious injustice.

Mahatma Gandhi's Salt Satyagraha (1930) and Martin Luther King Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (1958). The literature on civil disobedience provides an important test for all these theories.¹¹ These episodes demonstrate situations in which individuals deliberately violated particular laws while appealing to broader principles of justice and morality. Such examples make the obedience question more difficult, because they show that breaking a law can sometimes be presented not as a rejection of law itself, but as a challenge to a particular legal rule or system.

Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (1977). Dworkin provides a critical perspective on legal positivism by giving importance to legal principles, rights and political morality.¹² His emphasis on principles raises the question whether legal obligation can always be explained through social practices and accepted rules alone. His work is particularly relevant to situations in which judges or citizens must deal with conflicts between established legal rules and principles of justice.

⁹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* chs 17-18 (1651); John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, bk II, chs 8-9 (1690); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, bk I, chs 6-7 (1762).

¹⁰ Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* chs 1-2 (1789).

¹¹ Dennis Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action* ch 4 (Columbia University Press 1993); Martin Luther King Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (Harper & Brothers 1958).

¹² Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* 14-45 (Harvard University Press 1977).

John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (1980). Finnis develops a modern natural law approach in which law is connected with practical reason, basic human goods and the common good.¹³ His work is useful to the present research because it provides a contrasting perspective to legal positivism. It also helps to examine whether the moral quality and purpose of law have a role in determining its claim to obedience.

IV. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

A. The Problem of Obedience Distinguished from the Problem of Validity

It is important to separate two questions that are often run together: “Is this rule legally valid?” and “Am I obligated to obey it?” A rule can satisfy every criterion of validity within a legal system and yet a citizen may still ask whether she has a moral, as opposed to merely legal, reason to comply. Positivists such as Hart and Austin¹⁴ answer the validity question by reference to social facts: for Austin, a sovereign’s command; for Hart, the rule of recognition.

They remain agnostic, at the level of legal theory, about whether valid law generates a genuine moral obligation. Natural lawyers, by contrast, tend to collapse the two questions, holding that only law which conforms to higher moral or rational standards commands obedience in the first place. The obedience question therefore functions as a testing ground on which the deeper disagreement between positivism and natural law plays out in practical terms.

B. Classical Answers to the Obedience Question

Several long-standing theories offer grounds for obedience. The *divine command* and classical natural law traditions, from Aquinas onward, ground obedience in law’s conformity with reason and the eternal law; an unjust law, on the strongest version of this view, creates no obligation at all.¹⁵ *Social contract theory*, developed by Hobbes,

¹³ John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Clarendon Press 1980).

¹⁴ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 82-91; Austin, *supra* note 4, at 18-30.

¹⁵ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 185-93.

Locke, and Rousseau, and revived by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*, grounds obedience in a hypothetical or tacit agreement: citizens who accept the benefits of an ordered society security, cooperation, and the rule of law itself incur a reciprocal duty to obey its rules, subject to the system reasonably just.¹⁶

Utilitarian theory, associated with Bentham, grounds obedience in the general welfare produced in the stable legal order, since the costs of general disobedience (disorder, unpredictability) typically outweigh the benefits of any particular act of defiance¹⁷. Each of these theories supplies a moral argument external to law itself for why law's subjects should comply. Hart's positivism approaches the matter differently, from within the structure of legal systems rather than from an external moral theory.

C. Hart's Account: The Internal Point of View and the Practice Theory of Rules

Hart's most original contribution to the obedience question lies not in a moral argument for compliance but in his analysis of what it means for a rule to be "binding" within a social practice. In *The Concept of Law*, Hart distinguished being *obliged* to do something the gunman's "your money or your life," where compliance is merely a response to threatened sanction from being *obligated* or under an *obligation*, which involves a rule accepted as a standard of conduct.

Austin's command theory, resting on habitual obedience to a sovereign backed by sanctions, could explain only the former: the citizen who obeys purely from fear of punishment is in the position of the gunman's victim, not a legal subject under obligation. Hart's alternative, the "practice theory" of rules, holds that a genuine rule of obligation exists within a group when there is a convergent pattern of behavior, a critical reflective attitude toward that pattern as a common standard, and the use of normative language "ought," "must," "wrong" to criticize deviation. Officials, and ideally citizens, who hold

¹⁶ Rawls, *supra* note 8, at 342-50.

¹⁷ Bentham, *supra* note 10.

this internal point of view toward the rule of recognition and the rules validated by it do not merely predict sanctions; they accept the rules as reasons for action and as standards for evaluating their own and other's conduct.¹⁸

This account explains legal obligation as a social fact about attitudes and practices rather than as a conclusion drawn from an independent moral theory. It allows Hart to say that a legal system can function, and its rules can be genuinely "binding" in this internal sense, even where citizens differ sharply on the deeper moral question of whether they have most reason, all things considered, to comply.

Importantly, Hart never claimed that the internal acceptance of a rule by officials, or its status as valid law, automatically generates a moral obligation on citizens to obey; this is precisely the gap his separation thesis preserves.¹⁹ The practice theory explains what it means to say a rule is legally obligatory within a system; it does not, by itself, answer the further, moral question of whether the citizen ought, morally, to comply with that legally obligatory rule.

D. Law's Minimum Content and the Practical Case for a Stable Legal Order

Hart's discussion of the "minimum content of natural law," examined in his account of survival truisms about the human condition, supplies an indirect but influential practical argument for obedience.²⁰ Given human vulnerability and limited altruism, some system of mutual restraint resembling prohibitions on violence and rules of property and promise keeping is a precondition for any tolerable social existence.²¹ Widespread disobedience threatens the coordination and security that even law's harshest critics depend upon.²² This is close to, though distinct from, the utilitarian and social-contract arguments:

¹⁸ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 82-91.

¹⁹ Hart, *supra* note 2, at 593-594.

²⁰ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 193-200.

²¹ *Id.* at 194-197.

²² *Id.* at 193-200.

Hart's point is less that obedience is directly required by morality than that a functioning legal order, whatever its particular content, secures goods predictability, coordination, protection from the "war of all against all" that citizens generally have strong prudential and moral reasons to preserve, which in turn generates a qualified, defeasible reason to support and generally comply with the system as a whole.

E. Raz's Service Conception and the Limits of a General Duty to Obey

Joseph Raz, building on and departing from Hart, offered an influential refinement in *The Authority of Law* and *The Morality of Freedom*.²³ On Raz's "service conception," law claims authority by purporting to give subjects reasons for action that replace their own independent judgment law is meant to help subjects act as they have independent reason to act, more reliably than they would by reasoning for themselves.²⁴

Crucially, Raz denied that there is a general, content independent moral obligation to obey the law simply because it is law; whether a particular directive binds a particular subject in a particular case depends on whether following it actually serves the reasons the law claims to track.²⁵ This qualifies Hart's more institution centered account by shifting attention to the conditions under which law's claim to authority is, in fact, justified for a given person, rather than treating obedience as a uniform duty flowing automatically from valid enactment.

F. Fuller's Reciprocity Argument: Legality as the Ground of Fidelity

Lon Fuller, Hart's principal antagonist on the separation thesis, offered a complementary account of obedience rooted in his "Inner morality of law"²⁶. Because a legal system that is general, publicized, prospective, clear, consistent, stable, and

²³ Joseph Raz, *The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality* 233-49 (Clarendon Press 1979); Raz, *supra* note 7, at 53-69.

²⁴ Raz, *supra* note 7, at 53.

²⁵ Raz, *The Authority of Law*, *supra* note 23, at 233-35.

²⁶ Fuller, *supra* note 6, at 38-39.

congruently enforced treats its subjects as responsible agents capable of planning their lives around known rules.²⁷ Fuller argued that such a system generates a relationship of reciprocity between lawgiver and Citizen: the state undertakes to govern through open, predictable rules, and the citizen, in turn, owes a degree of fidelity to those rules.²⁸

Where a regime systematically violates the inner morality of law through secret decrees, retroactive punishment, or rules never actually enforced as declared Fuller thought the reciprocal basis for obedience collapses along with legality itself, so that fidelity is properly withheld not because the content of the rules is unjust but because the very practice of “governance through rules” has broken down. This procedural account sits alongside Hart’s practice theory as a further explanation of why obedience is owed within a well-functioning system, while helping to explain, better than Hart’s own framework does on its own, why citizens under grossly defective regimes may feel no residual obligation even to technically valid enactments.

G. The Hard Case: Civil Disobedience and Unjust Law

The obedience question is tested most sharply by civil disobedience, that is, the open, conscientious and generally non-violent breach of law undertaken to protest a perceived injustice, exemplified by the Indian Salt Satyagraha under Gandhi²⁹ and the American civil rights movement under Martin Luther King Jr.³⁰ Natural law theory can accommodate such disobedience readily: an unjust law is not true law, so refusing it involves no real conflict with legal obligation properly understood.³¹

Hart’s positivism, having separated legal validity from moral merit, must instead say that civil disobedience involves a genuine, acknowledged breach of valid law, undertaken

²⁷ Id. at 39-40.

²⁸ Id.

²⁹ Dalton, *supra* note 11, ch 4.

³⁰ King, *supra* note 11; see also Martin Luther King Jr., *Letter from Birmingham City Jail* (1963).

³¹ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 200-05.

because the moral reasons against a particular statute outweigh the general moral reasons for supporting a legal system's stability.³²

This is, in one sense, a less comfortable position than the natural lawyer's, since it cannot dissolve the conflict by definitional fiat; but Hart would regard this as a virtue rather than a defect, since it forces open acknowledgment of the moral stakes rather than concealing them behind claims that the unjust rule was never really law. That is precisely the point he pressed against the German courts in the Grudge Informer case,³³ where he preferred openly retroactive legislation to the pretence that a valid, if odious, wartime statute had been void from the start.

V. CRITICAL EVALUATION

Hart's practice theory has been influential but not uncontested. Ronald Dworkin criticised it for reducing obligation to a matter of social convergence and normative attitude, arguing that a social practice cannot by itself explain the duties which the participants take that practice to impose.³⁴ Dworkin later developed the point through his conception of law as integrity, which grounds legal obligation in principles of political morality rather than in convergent official behaviour.³⁵

Others note that Hart's account better explains obligation among officials operating the rule of recognition than among ordinary citizens, many of whom obey out of habit, inertia, or fear of sanction rather than genuine internal acceptance, which is precisely the gunman-like motivation Hart sought to distinguish from true obligation. Raz's service conception addresses part of this gap by making authority conditional and person-relative rather than blanket and automatic.³⁶

³² Hart, *supra* note 2, at 618-20.

³³ Oberlandesgericht Bamberg, 27 July 1949, 5 *Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung* 207 (1950); see Hart, *supra* note 2, at 618-20.

³⁴ Ronald Dworkin, *Social Rules and Legal Theory*, 81 *Yale L.J.* 855, 861-68 (1972), reprinted as *The Model of Rules II* in Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* ch 3 (Harvard University Press 1977).

³⁵ Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* 176-79 (Fontana Press 1986).

³⁶ Raz, *The Authority of Law*, *supra* note 23, at 233-35.

Despite these criticisms, Hart's central achievement endures: by separating the sociological question of what makes a rule count as legally obligatory within a system from the moral question of whether citizens ought to comply with it, he supplied later theorists with the analytical vocabulary needed to debate obedience honestly, without collapsing description into prescription.

VI. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing analysis supports a set of recommendations about how a legal system may secure obedience on grounds stronger than the fear of sanction.

1. First, a legal system should cultivate the internal point of view rather than rely upon deterrence. Where officials and citizens accept rules as common standards and criticise deviation in normative terms, compliance rests upon acceptance rather than upon a calculation of risk, and the legal order becomes correspondingly more stable.
2. Secondly, lawmaking and administration should satisfy the procedural conditions of legality. Generality, publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency and congruence between the declared rule and official action treat subjects as responsible agents and generate the reciprocity upon which fidelity to law depends.
3. Thirdly, claims of authority should be justified rather than assumed. On the service conception, a directive binds a particular subject because following it enables that subject to act better upon the reasons which already apply, so institutions should be designed, and their competence limited, with that justification in view.
4. Fourthly, a legal system should provide lawful channels for conscientious dissent. Rights of petition, judicial review and constitutional challenge allow moral disagreement to be expressed within the system, and they reduce the occasions on which a citizen must choose between conscience and compliance.

5. Finally, where disobedience to a seriously unjust law does occur, the legal system should confront the conflict openly rather than deny the legal status of the rule in question. Honest acknowledgment that a valid law may be unjust preserves both the clarity of legal analysis and the moral seriousness of the citizen's choice.

VII. CONCLUSION

There is no single, uncontroversial answer to why people should obey the law; natural law, social contract, utilitarian, and positivist traditions each supply a different kind of reason moral conformity, reciprocal fairness, aggregate welfare, or the practical necessity of a stable coordinating order³⁷. Hart's distinctive contribution is not a moral theory of obligation but an analytical one:

his internal point of view and practice theory of rules explain what it means for a rule to bind within a functioning legal system, while his separation thesis insists that sociological fact does not, by itself, settle whether citizens have a moral reason to comply.

This leaves room, as the case of civil disobedience shows, for principled disobedience to valid law where the moral stakes demand it a possibility that Hart's framework, precisely because it refuses to define away the conflict between law and morality, is better equipped to confront honestly than accounts that simply deny the name of law to whatever they consider unjust.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994)
Oxford University Press – The Concept of Law,
<https://academic.oup.com/book/32426>.
2. Joseph Raz, *The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality*, Clarendon Press,

³⁷ Hart, *supra* note 3, at 82-91, 193-200.

- Oxford (1979). Oxford Academic <https://academic.oup.com/book/10820>.
3. Lon L. Fuller, *The Morality of Law*, Yale University Press, New Haven (1964), Worldcat *The Morality of Law* <https://search.worldcat.org/title/The-morality-of-law-/oclc/518014>.
 4. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1971). JSTOR – *A Theory of Justice* <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9z6v>.
 5. Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1977). WorldCat <https://search.worldcat.org/title/taking-rights-seriously/oclc/2847963>.
 6. John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1980). Notre Dame Law School – *Natural Law and Natu Rights*.
 7. John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford (2011).
 8. A.W. Brian Simpson, *Reflections on “The Concept of Law”*, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2011). Oxford Academic – *Reflections on “The Concept of Law”*.
 9. John Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* (1832).
 10. Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789).
 11. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651); John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (1690); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (1762).
 12. H.L.A. Hart, *Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals*, 71 *Harvard Law Review* 593 (1958).
 13. Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986).
 14. Ronald Dworkin, *Social Rules and Legal Theory*, 81 *Yale Law Journal* 855 (1972), reprinted as *The Model of Rules II* in *Taking Rights Seriously*, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge (1977).

15. Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire*, Fontana Press, London (1986).
16. Dennis Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*, Columbia University Press, New York (1993).
17. Martin Luther King Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*, Harper & Brothers, New York (1958).
18. Oberlandesgericht Bamberg, 27 July 1949, 5 *Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung* 207 (1950).