STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ELECTION COMMISSION APPOINTMENT REFORMS IN INDIA

This research critically examines the appointment framework of the Election Commission of India, identifying structural vulnerabilities that compromise its constitutional mandate of independence. The paper traces the paradoxical design of Article 324, which grants expansive functional powers to the Commission while leaving appointment procedures dangerously undefined. Through analysis of judicial evolution culminating in the landmark Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) judgment, the research demonstrates how the Supreme Court has finally addressed appointment vulnerabilities after decades of avoidance. The study evaluates comparative international frameworks from Canada, South Africa, Australia, and Mexico, extracting principles for effective reform. The research argues that comprehensive reforms require legislative action beyond the Court’s interim mechanism, including transparent qualification requirements, diverse professional backgrounds, multi-stakeholder selection, and post-appointment safeguards. The paper concludes that appointment reforms are not merely institutional adjustments but essential reinforcements of democratic integrity. By synthesizing constitutional jurisprudence, international best practices, and democratic principles, this research provides a roadmap for transforming the Election Commission from nominal to substantive independence, thereby strengthening India’s electoral democracy.