THE GIG ECONOMY AND COMPETITION LAW: A FRAMEWORK FOR CURBING PLATFORM-BASED MARKET ABUSE

The proliferation of digital platforms has revolutionized labor markets through the gig economy model. This paper examines the intersection of India’s competition law framework with platform-based labor markets. It analyzes how dominant platforms exercise substantial market power in ways that may constitute abuse. The Indian Competition Act, 2002, and the proposed Digital Competition Law have yet to fully address platform-specific challenges. These platforms frequently exhibit winner-takes-all dynamics through network effects and data aggregation advantages. Worker misclassification further compounds competitive distortions by enabling cost advantages through regulatory arbitrage.

This research explores how algorithmic management systems create information asymmetries that disadvantage both workers and consumers. It proposes a specialized regulatory framework addressing the unique characteristics of platform markets. The paper advocates a two-pronged approach: adapting competition law doctrines to platform contexts and developing platform-specific regulations.

Additionally, it examines worker classification reforms to eliminate unfair competitive advantages. Drawing comparisons with international approaches like the EU Digital Markets Act, this study contributes to the developing jurisprudence on platform regulation in India. Policy recommendations focus on enhancing algorithmic transparency, establishing gatekeeper criteria, and improving regulatory oversight to curb anticompetitive practices in India’s rapidly evolving digital ecosystem.