The Federal nature of India as envisaged in the Constitution of India, represents an interactive and harmonious liaison between the Centre and the States along the legislative, administrative and financial spheres. The workings of Indian federalism, however, have been characterized by intra-State domination, hiccups and unbalanced growth. The paper has taken a critical look at the constitutional provisions (Articles 245 to 263), institutional mechanism, and changing politics that characterize Centre State relationship. It points out structural problems like vertical fiscal imbalance, little autonomy of States, political centralization and deterioration of consultative forums like the Inter-State Council and Finances Commission. This paper finds that the evidences suggest systemic encumbrance on federal operations through an examination of the occurrence of the following policy episodes, which include; the announcement of the GST, passing of the farm laws, and failing to compensate GST.  More so, it proposes inter-State developmental inequalities, emergency measures, and politicization of the powers of the governor to be major obstacles of cooperative federalism. Based on constitutional directive, expert reports of the committee and monetary statistics, the paper offers solutions with reformist leaning such as fortification of institutional federalism, adjustment of fiscal transfers and formalized consultations between the Centre and the State. It is concluded that, in order to reap the fulfilment of a balanced, inclusive and a functioning federal India, it is important to commit again to the principles of decentralisation, democratic federalism and mutual respect between the States and the Union.