This research critically explores the Supreme Court of India’s landmark 2024 judgment that struck down the Electoral Bonds Scheme (EBS) along with the related amendments to the Representation of the People Act, the Companies Act, and the Income Tax Act. Adopting both doctrinal and comparative perspectives, the study engages with questions of transparency in political funding, constitutional rights, and the wider implications for safeguarding free and fair elections in India. The Court unanimously concluded that by allowing unlimited and anonymous corporate donations, the EBS violated the voters’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and political equality under Article 14—thereby eroding the democratic foundation of “one person, one vote.” The paper also assesses how the 2017 Finance Act systematically diluted earlier safeguards, such as the ₹20,000 disclosure threshold under Section 29C of the Representation of the People Act, the 7.5% ceiling on corporate donations under Section 182 of the Companies Act, and the mandatory record-keeping obligations under Section 13A of the Income Tax Act. By weakening or removing these provisions, the EBS entrenched opacity, widened economic inequality in political influence, and opened the door to quid pro quo arrangements. In its reasoning, the Court reaffirmed the integrated approach to fundamental rights by invoking the doctrine of “manifest arbitrariness” and applying the proportionality test. At the same time, this paper argues that the Court could have gone beyond reinstating the earlier legal framework. While striking down the EBS, it could have issued guidelines that both acknowledged the government’s rationale for introducing the scheme and set transparency safeguards for future reforms. Such principles would have provided Parliament with a constitutional roadmap for designing a more balanced and accountable framework of political funding. Accordingly, this study proposes illustrative guidelines that the Court might have introduced while delivering its decision.