The constitutional provision of President’s Rule under Article 356 empowers the president to assume control of a State in situations of constitutional breakdown. Historically this power has been one of the most misused instruments od the Indian Constitution, often deployed to dismiss state governments on political rather than constitutional grounds. The landmark judgment of S. R. Bommai v. Union of India sought to curb this misuse by making such proclamations subject to judicial review and thus limiting president’s discretion. This paper revisits the judgment of Bommai in light of the increasing centralization of political powers and examines whether the safeguards remain effective today. By analyzing the recent cases the paper evaluates whether federalism continues to function as a ‘basic feature’ of our constitution or has been eroded through central dominance. This study examines the constitutional scheme of emergency powers, historical misuse patterns, and the evolving role of judiciary in protecting federalism. It is also argued that while Bommai established a strong precedent, the subsequent political developments and the decline of coalition politics have diluted its practical efficacy. It concludes by recommending reforms, such as codifying clear standards for constitutional breakdown, ensuring Governor’s accountability, and mandating pre-decisional judicial oversight before invoking Article 356.