FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ACCOUNTABILITY: REFORMING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
Mayur Mahajan, B.B.A. LL.B.(H) 2nd Year, Jaipur National University, Jaipur (India)
Labdhi Tervecha, B.B.A. LL.B.(H) 2nd Year, Jaipur National University, Jaipur (India)
Judicial appointments represent a vital democratic mechanism, balancing judicial independence with public duty and transparency. This paper examines appointment systems throughout a couple of jurisdictions, reading how democracies navigate tensions among protective judicial impartiality and making sure democratic legitimacy in selection methods. Through comparative constitutional analysis of govt appointments, legislative confirmations, judicial carrier commissions, and hybrid fashions, this study identifies key demanding situations: political interference, inadequate range, opaque selection criteria, and declining public believe in judicial institutions. examining reforms in India, the UK, South Africa, Canada, and America, the have a look at evaluates high-quality practices in advantage-primarily based choice, time period limits as opposed to lifestyles tenure, and citizen participation mechanisms. The studies argue in opposition to the fake dichotomy of independence as opposed to accountability, featuring instead an included framework wherein both ideas support each different. This evaluative model emphasizes transparency, inclusiveness, merit evaluation, and institutional safeguards in opposition to political manipulation and judicial insularity. The observe contributes empirical evidence and normative arguments for reimagining appointment approaches that preserve judicial legitimacy amid cutting-edge democratic challenges.
| 📄 Type | 🔍 Information |
|---|---|
| Research Paper | LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR), Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 2047–2066. |
| 🔗 Creative Commons | © Copyright |
| This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License . | © Authors, 2026. All rights reserved. |