This paper explores how the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) balances the tension between state sovereignty and global accountability in enforcing human rights. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), which oversees the Covenant, lacks binding powers and instead relies on state cooperation through periodic reports and individual communications under the First Optional Protocol (OP1). To strengthen accountability, the HRC has expanded its interpretive reach most notably through the “impact test” in General Comment No. 36 (GC 36), which broadens the Covenant’s extraterritorial scope. However, real progress is often limited by a compliance gap, as states resist external scrutiny in the name of constitutional autonomy and self-governance. The paper argues that true enforcement of the ICCPR does not depend on coercive authority but on the persuasive power of HRC findings, which, though not legally binding, can drive domestic legal and policy reform. Drawing on examples like young v. Australia, it shows how dialogue-based models between states and international bodies offer a practical path forward. In doing so, it highlights how the pursuit of global human rights protection continues to evolve within the realities of a world still deeply anchored in state sovereignty.