Judicial independence is the cornerstone of any constitutional democracy, be it that of India or anywhere else. Thereby the processes of appointment as well as removal of Judges has been a central topic of debate regarding separation of powers as propound by Montesquieu. This paper critically examines the constitutional framework overseeing judicial appointments under the ambit of Articles 124 and 217 and the removal of these judges through impeachment procedure under clause (4) of Article 124 and the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968. This paper further traces the ‘evolution’ trajectory of the now hotly debated ‘Collegium system’ from Sankalchand Seth Case to all the way over the 4 landmark cases involving the issue of ‘consultation whether amounts to concurrent’ and the creation of a Collegium, which are famously known as the ‘Judges Cases’. The study underpins the tension between judicial independence and democratic accountability. It also takes into account the ‘comparative perspective’ from the United States of America, United Kingdom and South Africa for understanding the need for transparency and involving the relevant stakeholders through participation in the appointment process. This paper further explores the reformatory proposals which are comprised of statutory codification of the appointment procedure of Judges; Disclosing the entire reasoning behind candidature on digital platforms; Reimagining the NJAC with apt safeguards. By positing India’s experience with that of the USA, UK and South Africa, this study argues for a nuanced approach towards reforms while maintaining a fine balance between Judicial independence and accountability so as to ensure Judicial legitimacy.