This research article provides a critical legal analysis of the protracted constitutional crisis in the Federal Republic of Somalia, currently exacerbated by the unilateral transition from the 2012 Provisional Constitution to a newly amended framework. While the 2012 document enjoyed a degree of broad-based political consensus, the study posits that the current review process is trapped in a “Trilemma” involving Executive Overreach, systemic Political Mistrust, and a profound Crisis of Federal Consensus. A primary focus of this paper is the recent constitutional amendments initiated by the Federal Government, which signify a fundamental shift in the Somali governance model. The study examines the legal implications of these amendments, which have encountered significant Statutory Resistance from key Federal Member States (FMS), specifically Puntland and Jubaland. From a jurisprudential perspective, the article argues that the exclusion of these sub-national entities undermines the principle of Cooperative Federalism and violates the spirit of Article 142, which safeguards the status of existing states. This unilateralism has resulted in a state of Legal Fragmentarily, where the amended constitution lacks universal legitimacy across the federation. Furthermore, the paper explores how this institutional deadlock is reinforced by the persistent dominance of the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing formula, which functions as the de facto Grundnorm over the written law. The research demonstrates that while formal constitutional articles are frequently bypassed, any breach of the informal clan equilibrium triggers immediate systemic instability. The article concludes that for Somalia to achieve Constitutional Supremacy, it must reconcile the tension between central executive ambitions and the autonomy of Federal Member States. Without a comprehensive political settlement, the new amendments risk deepening the national divide rather than providing a stable legal foundation.