This study examines the increasingly significant issue of repeat or consecutive appointments of arbitrators in commercial arbitration and analyses whether such appointments create actual or perceived bias capable of undermining the principles of independence and impartiality. The research focuses primarily on the Indian legal framework governing arbitrator appointments and challenges, while undertaking a comparative examination of the approaches adopted in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Paris under leading institutional arbitration regimes. Employing a combined doctrinal and empirical methodology, the study analyses statutory provisions, judicial decisions, institutional rules, published appointment patterns, and arbitrator challenge outcomes. The empirical assessment demonstrates that appointments remain concentrated among a relatively small group of experienced arbitrators, whereas successful challenges based on alleged bias remain consistently rare across major arbitral institutions. These findings indicate that repeat appointments, although not constituting evidence of actual bias by themselves, may nevertheless generate structural risks affecting public confidence in arbitral neutrality. The study argues that existing disclosure-based safeguards are insufficient to address these concerns comprehensively. It therefore proposes reforms including strengthened and continuous disclosure obligations, enhanced institutional scrutiny of appointments, diversification of the arbitrator pool, and limitations on unilateral appointment mechanisms. The paper’s principal contribution lies in integrating doctrinal analysis with comparative and empirical evidence to demonstrate that preserving party autonomy must be balanced with institutional safeguards that reinforce transparency, impartiality, and confidence in contemporary arbitration, particularly within the evolving Indian arbitration framework.