The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) transformed India’s domestic debt-resolution framework, yet for nearly a decade cross-border insolvency remained confined to Sections 234 and 235, two skeletal provisions dependent on bilateral reciprocity and letters of request that India never meaningfully operationalised. As Indian corporate groups accumulated overseas assets and foreign lenders extended credit to Indian borrowers, this statutory vacuum produced tribunal-led improvisation and, most visibly, parallel Delaware and Indian proceedings in the Byju’s insolvency, where GLAS Trust Company lacked any statutory mechanism for coordinated recognition, although the Supreme Court proceedings ultimately turned on a domestic procedural issue rather than cross-border recognition itself. This paper undertakes a doctrinal examination of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, which inserts Section 240C, Section 240B, and Chapter VA and moves India, at least textually, toward the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 1997. It argues that the 2026 Amendment is best understood as an unfinished reform: Section 240C, Section 240B, and the Chapter VA group insolvency framework were excluded from the commencement notification that brought the bulk of the Amendment into force on 26 May 2026, leaving foreign creditors without an operative recognition mechanism and group insolvency coordination still inoperative. Drawing on the legislative history from the Eradi and Irani Committees to the Insolvency Law Committee’s 2018 report, and on comparative practice in the United States, United Kingdom, Singapore, and the European Union, the paper evaluates whether India’s calibrated, reciprocity-conscious approach is defensible or risks reproducing uncertainty. It recommends prompt rule-making under Section 240C, specialised NCLT capacity-building, and closer alignment with the Judicial Insolvency Network Guidelines.