Separation of powers is usually a well-known constitutional formula that is being acted out as a theatre of unceasing rivalry. There is no place where this is clearer than in India, where the three arms of State, Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary seldom act separately. Rather, they often encroach on the others territory, and we end up in a game of institutional tug of war. This tension is not by chance; it is a natural result of a constitutional structure which does not seek to separate its powers in strict line, but to provide a more practical overlap. This paper is going to contend that these institutional conflicts are not just instances of friction, but important pointers of the health and strength of Indian democracy. In most instances, judicial interventions tend to right executive overreach, legislative discussions seek to tame judicial overreach, and the executives take on a headbanging role at times of political need. The outcome is the existence of a dynamic equilibrium whereby there is co-existence of conflict and cooperation. This study provides a comparison of the development of the constitution in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe through the analysis of some of the most relevant cases, constitutional developments, and comparative views of the issue, demonstrating that stability of the Indian democracy is not in its institutional silence, but in its institutional struggle. The key issue that this paper is going to consider is whether this tug-of-war weakens governance by creating instability or its reinforcement of democracy by holding them accountable.