The maxim Actus Dei Nemini Facit Injuria, meaning “an act of God does injury to no one”, occupies a significant position in tort jurisprudence as a defence absolving liability where harm is caused exclusively by extraordinary natural forces beyond human control. Rooted in Roman law and developed through English common law, the doctrine reflects the foundational principle that the law does not impose liability for events that human foresight and prudence cannot reasonably anticipate or prevent. This research critically examines the jurisprudential basis, scope, and contemporary relevance of the maxim within modern tort law. Adopting a doctrinal research methodology, the study relies on judicial precedents from Indian and English courts, statutory provisions, and scholarly commentary. It analyses leading cases such as Nichols v. Marsland (1876) and Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway Co. (1917), along with Indian decisions including Ramalinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar (1971), to evaluate the judicial standards governing the defence. The research identifies key limitations in the application of the maxim, including ambiguity in defining what constitutes an “extraordinary” natural event, inconsistency in judicial interpretation, exclusion of hybrid or human-induced uncontrollable events, and tension between fairness to defendants and compensation for victims. The study further highlights the doctrinal overlap between the maxim and related principles such as force majeure, strict liability, and insurance frameworks, which has reduced its independent operational significance. The paper concludes that while Actus Dei Nemini Facit Injuria retains symbolic and theoretical value in affirming that the law does not demand the impossible, its practical relevance in contemporary tort jurisprudence has narrowed. A calibrated reinterpretation aligned with modern disaster management and liability principles is therefore necessary.