Election commissions in developing nations work inside fragile democracies with deep social divides and uneven state capacity, so pressure on electoral administration stays high. This paper studies how law, institutions and political practice shape the independence and credibility of these bodies. It takes India as the primary case and then compares it with other developing jurisdictions to see how different constitutional choices seek to secure free and fair elections. The analysis links domestic rules with global norms on political participation. It places guarantees of genuine periodic elections under Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and General Comment No. 25 next to national constitutional provisions. It then studies how Article 324 of the Constitution of India, the Representation of the People Acts and related rules build the mandate of the Election Commission of India, and how far this mandate reflects emerging good practice in the Global South. Attention also goes to voter registration, campaign regulation, media oversight and the rapid growth of digital tools in electioneering, since these factors test the capacity of election commissions in visible ways. The paper engages with decisions of the Supreme Court of India and apex courts in other developing democracies. It examines how courts describe the idea of free and fair elections, and how they use judicial review to protect or reshape the powers of election commissions. Decisions such as Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and the South African case New National Party of South Africa v. Government of the Republic of South Africa illustrate how courts treat election bodies as constitutional guardians of electoral integrity.