Progressing from the question ‘Why is the independence of the judiciary necessary?’ to ‘How to make the judiciary independent?’ The constitutional discourse has rightly shifted to ‘How to keep the judiciary independent?’ The Aristotelian idea of separating functions has, to some extent, protected the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive and the legislature, but in the present, threats to the judiciary’s independence have become more varied and eclectic. These threats not only arise from the other two organs of government but also from the people and the nation’s politics. Modern constitutions around the world have acknowledged this and sought to insulate the judiciary from pernicious influences. A comparative study of different constitutional mechanisms enables us to identify both common and country-specific threats to the independence of the judiciary and learn from their experiences in mitigating them. This paper compares the constitutions of India, Thailand, Germany, and France, utilising the geographical and institutional diversity of their systems to achieve a richer comparison. The paper analyses the Constitutional texts, Relevant Legal statutes, Key committee reports, and various Case laws to get an objective view of the issue, untainted by the opinionated debates surrounding it. The end goal is to contribute to the rich discourse on the subject by identifying the glaring issues and the best practices for their resolution. In India, debates over the opacity of the collegium system, post-retirement appointments, and judicial accountability have intensified. Focusing on India, the paper will suggest practical and effective solutions to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and help in mitigating various threats arising from not only the other two organs of the government, the legislature, and the executive, but also from the people, the media and the politics of the country.