The Supreme Court of India’s curative ruling in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. (2024) has reopened a foundational question that lies at the seam between constitutional jurisdiction and arbitral autonomy: when, if ever, may the Court invoke its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to undo an arbitral award that has already withstood challenge under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an appeal under Article 136, and a subsequent review? The Court answered “yes” annulling an award of approximately INR 7,600 crores in favour of a private concessionaire on the ground that it suffered from “patent illegality” amounting to a “grave miscarriage of justice.” This paper undertakes a doctrinal and analytical inquiry into the constitutional architecture of arbitral finality in India after DMRC v. DAMEPL. It contends that the decision exposes an unresolved hierarchy problem in Indian law: while Section 5 of the Arbitration Act codifies a legislative command of minimum judicial intervention, the Supreme Court retains a constitutional jurisdiction under Article 142 that operates outside the statute and therefore beyond Section 5’s textual reach. The paper argues that this jurisdictional asymmetry has been amplified by an emergent, largely unstated public-exchequer protectionism that risks running afoul of Article 14. Drawing on comparative jurisprudence from England, Singapore and the UNCITRAL Model Law, it proposes a “Constitutional Minimum Test” to cabin the Court’s curative powers in arbitration: such review should lie only where the impugned arbitral process or its judicial ratification breaches a constitutional, rather than merely contractual, threshold. The paper concludes with calibrated suggestions for doctrinal containment, legislative reform, and the restoration of investor confidence in India’s seat-of-arbitration credentials.