REGULATORY CAPTURE IN INDIA: WHEN REGULATORS SERVE THE ELITE
Jenimettilda J, LL.M, 4th Semester, Student at Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (India)
Regulatory bodies play an important role in modern governance because they are responsible for overseeing industries, enforcing legal standards, and ensuring that economic activities are carried out in a fair and accountable manner. In India, several independent regulatory institutions have been established in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, securities markets, environmental protection, competition law, and natural resources. These bodies are expected to function impartially and strike a balance between economic development and public welfare. However, concerns have increasingly been raised about regulatory capture, a situation in which regulators become influenced by the very groups they are meant to regulate. When this happens, regulatory decisions may begin to favour powerful corporations, influential business interests, or political actors rather than the interests of the wider public. This article examines the idea of regulatory capture in the Indian context and explores the ways in which elite influence can affect regulatory decision-making. It discusses the development of the concept and its relevance in contemporary regulatory governance. The study further analyses how regulatory capture may arise in important sectors such as telecommunications, environmental administration, financial regulation, and natural resource management. It argues that regulatory capture should be viewed as a form of elite class deviance because it allows powerful groups to secure advantages through institutional influence while often remaining beyond direct legal scrutiny. The article also highlights the wider consequences of regulatory capture, including reduced public trust, weakened accountability, distorted market conditions, and challenges to democratic governance. In light of these concerns, the study suggests a number of reforms aimed at improving transparency, strengthening institutional independence, enhancing accountability, and encouraging greater public participation in regulatory processes. Such measures are necessary to ensure that regulatory institutions continue to serve the public interest and remain resistant to undue influence from powerful elite groups.
| 📄 Type | 🔍 Information |
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| Research Paper | LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR), Volume 4, Issue 2, Page 1823–1856. |
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| This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License . | © Authors, 2026. All rights reserved. |