The value of human rights becomes meaningful only when legal guarantees are supported by effective and enforceable remedies. In India, the judiciary has played a decisive role in transforming constitutional promises into practical protection through judicial review, writ jurisdiction, public interest litigation and purposive interpretation of fundamental rights. This dissertation examines the role of the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts in protecting human rights, with particular reference to Articles 32, 226 and 21 of the Constitution. It traces the doctrinal development of Indian human-rights jurisprudence through leading decisions including Kesavananda Bharati, Maneka Gandhi, Hussainara Khatoon, Olga Tellis, Vishaka, D.K. Basu, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Navtej Singh Johar. The study adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology based on constitutional provisions, statutes, landmark judgments, international human-rights instruments and selected scholarly literature. It argues that the judiciary has been most effective where it has widened access to justice, protected vulnerable groups, restrained executive arbitrariness and interpreted life and liberty in terms of dignity, fairness and autonomy. At the same time, judicial protection is limited by implementation deficits, docket pressure, institutional capacity and the need to respect separation of powers. The dissertation concludes that while the Indian judiciary remains central to the protection of human rights, sustainable protection requires legal aid, administrative accountability, legislative support, police and prison reform, rights education and faithful adherence to constitutional values.