The increasing criminalisation of electoral politics presents a serious challenge to democratic governance, public accountability, and the rule of law in India. In response, recent proposals have called for imposing a lifetime ban on convicted politicians to restore public trust and protect electoral integrity. This paper critically examines whether such permanent exclusions are constitutionally justified or whether they risk undermining democratic participation itself. The study focuses on Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which currently prescribes time-bound disqualification following conviction. Using a doctrinal methodology grounded in constitutional law, the paper applies the structured proportionality test to assess the legality of both the existing disqualification regime and the proposed lifetime ban. It evaluates these measures against Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21 of the Indian Constitution, emphasising political participation as a core democratic right rather than a mere statutory privilege. Judicial developments in Lily Thomas v. Union of India and Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India are analysed to highlight the judiciary’s evolving approach to electoral accountability, legislative competence, and democratic restraint. The paper further adopts a comparative perspective, drawing on international jurisprudence, particularly the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Paksas v. Lithuania, and Commonwealth models that favour time-limited and reviewable disqualifications. The paper argues that while safeguarding electoral integrity is a legitimate democratic objective, lifetime disqualification fails the necessity and balancing requirements of proportionality by permanently excluding individuals from political life and disregarding the possibility of rehabilitation. It concludes by proposing a graded, offence-based disqualification framework that better reconciles electoral integrity with democratic participation, constitutional accountability, and the rule of law.