The Commissions of Inquiry Act of 1952 created a proper legal way to investigate important issues using groups of people who could find out the facts without being told what to think. In contemporary India, commissions are frequently constituted in response to political controversies, communal violence, administrative failures, corruption allegations, and other matters affecting public confidence in governance. They should make things more open, make those in power answer for their actions and make the public trust the government, but how they work in reality is a complicated mix of being used properly and being used to manipulate a situation.  This study critically examines the role of commissions as mechanisms for fact-finding and political accountability. The Nanavati Commission illustrates their constructive role in documenting historical wrongs and recommending institutional reforms, whereas the prolonged duration and limited implementation of the Liberhan Commission highlight structural inefficiencies and diminished public confidence. The article also considers what judges think, specifically the guidelines from the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, which explain that these commissions don’t actually make judgements, they just give advice. The study concludes that commissions remain valuable democratic institutions despite persistent challenges arising from political interference, procedural delay, and the non-binding nature of their recommendations. Through statutory analysis, judicial interpretation, and institutional examples, it distinguishes legitimate public inquiries from their misuse and proposes reforms to strengthen independence, efficiency, and implementation of commission recommendations.