A dying declaration is admissible under Section 26(a) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 even though the maker cannot be cross-examined. The rule rests on the assumption that a person facing death is unlikely to speak falsely. In practice, however, a victim may make more than one statement before death. When such statements differ on material points, including the identity of the assailant or the manner in which the injury was caused, courts must determine which declaration, if any, can safely be relied upon. This paper addresses that precise doctrinal and practical difficulty. Its focus is not on restating every condition for a valid dying declaration, but on examining judicial treatment of multiple and inconsistent declarations under Section 26(a). The paper adopts a doctrinal methodology by analysing the statutory text, leading Supreme Court decisions, standard Indian commentaries on evidence law, and limited comparative reference to the narrower English rule. Particular attention is given to authorities such as Amol Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, Jagbir Singh v State (NCT of Delhi), and the recent decision in Jemaben v State of Gujarat. The central argument is that the admissibility of a dying declaration is only the starting point; its reliability must be tested independently and contextually. Building on the multi-factor approach in Jagbir Singh, the paper proposes a compact five-step judicial sequence: chronological mapping, scrutiny of voluntariness and fitness, classification of material inconsistencies, conditional preference for independent recording, and reasoned judicial selection. This structured approach does not alter the existing doctrine. Rather, it converts established principles into a clearer procedural checklist, reduces the risk of selective acceptance, and promotes greater transparency in cases where the deceased has left behind conflicting accounts.