India’s direct tax administration has, within a few years, acquired three capabilities that were individually unremarkable but are jointly formidable: algorithmic selection of cases for reassessment (sections 273 and 281 of the Income-tax Act 2025, formerly sections 144B and 148A of the Income-tax Act 1961), forensic access to the digital lives of taxpayers during search (section 247, formerly section 132), and pre-adjudicatory attachment of bank accounts and other property (section 500, formerly section 281B). This paper asks whether the procedural convergence of these powers, left without statutory safeguards, offends the constitutional guarantees of Articles 14, 20(3), 21, 19(1)(g) and 300A, and how it fares against the standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the emerging law on automated decision-making. Using a doctrinal-comparative method, the paper argues that the strongest constitutional objections lie not in the existence of these powers but in their design: unpublished risk criteria, the absence of independent control over the acquisition and retention of digital material, and the absence of proportionality limits on freezing orders. It also confronts the weight of adverse authority, from Pooran Mal to R K Garg, and explains why the new jurisprudence on proportionality and informational privacy permits a principled departure from fiscal exceptionalism. It notes that in March 2026 the Supreme Court declined to entertain a challenge to the search power, disposing of the petition as withdrawn with liberty to represent to the Government and without ruling on the merits, which strengthens rather than weakens the case for a legislative solution. The paper concludes with a legislative blueprint comprising a Digital Search Protocol, an algorithmic transparency mandate and substantive guardrails for provisional attachment.