Article 368 of the Constitution of India empowers Parliament to amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal. A sustained debate surrounds the question whether this power extends far enough to alter or destroy the structure on which the Constitution rests. This paper critically examines the amending power of Parliament and the tension between parliamentary supremacy and constitutionalism, together with the role of the judiciary in protecting the essential features of the Constitution. The early decisions in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo and Sajjan Singh recognised a broad amending power, while Golaknath denied Parliament the power to abridge fundamental rights. Kesavananda Bharati resolved the conflict through the basic structure doctrine, which Minerva Mills, the NJAC case and Janhit Abhiyan later applied. Adopting the doctrinal method, the paper tests the doctrine against the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, which reserves one-third of the seats in the Lok Sabha, the State Legislative Assemblies and the Delhi Legislative Assembly for women. The Act came into force on 16 April 2026, but the reservation remains inoperative until delimitation after the next census, and the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-first Amendment) Bill, 2026 failed in the Lok Sabha for want of the special majority. The paper concludes that the amending power is wide but limited, and it proposes procedural reforms to strengthen deliberation on constitutional amendments.