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Basic Structure Doctrine

POWER OF PARLIAMENT TO AMEND CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 368: AN OVERVIEW

POWER OF PARLIAMENT TO AMEND CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 368: AN OVERVIEW Komal Patel, Ninth Semester Student Pursuing BA-LLB at Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar School of Law, Rashtrasant Tukadoji Maharaj Nagpur University (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.376 Article 368 of the Constitution of India empowers Parliament to amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal. A sustained debate surrounds the question whether this power extends far enough to alter or destroy the structure on which the Constitution rests. This paper critically examines the amending power of Parliament and the tension between parliamentary supremacy and constitutionalism, together with the role of the judiciary in protecting the essential features of the Constitution. The early decisions in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo and Sajjan Singh recognised a broad amending power, while Golaknath denied Parliament the power to abridge fundamental rights. Kesavananda Bharati resolved the conflict through the basic structure doctrine, which Minerva Mills, the NJAC case and Janhit Abhiyan later applied. Adopting the doctrinal method, the paper tests the doctrine against the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, which reserves one-third of the seats in the Lok Sabha, the State Legislative Assemblies and the Delhi Legislative Assembly for women. The Act came into force on 16 April 2026, but the reservation remains inoperative until delimitation after the next census, and the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-first Amendment) Bill, 2026 failed in the Lok Sabha for want of the special majority. The paper concludes that the amending power is wide but limited, and it proposes procedural reforms to strengthen deliberation on constitutional amendments.

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JUDICIAL REVIEW VS. PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UK AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

JUDICIAL REVIEW VS. PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UK AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK Aradhya Gupta, Student at Amity Law School, Noida (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.374 Constitutional supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty offer two different answers to a question common to every constitutional democracy: which organ should exercise final control over the making and validity of law? This paper examines how the United Kingdom and India answer that question through the relationship between legislative power and judicial review. The research problem is whether a sovereign Parliament and a constitutionally limited Parliament differ in kind or only in degree when courts review legislative and executive action. The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative method and analyses constitutional and statutory texts and the leading judgments of both jurisdictions, supported by secondary literature. On the UK side, it examines the Diceyan doctrine, the Human Rights Act 1998, R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, R (Jackson) v Attorney General and the post-Brexit restoration of legislative supremacy. On the Indian side, it examines Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India and SR Bommai v Union of India. The paper finds that the two systems differ in the remedy available against legislation rather than in the presence of legal limits. Indian courts may invalidate statutes, and even constitutional amendments that damage the basic structure, whereas UK courts may only interpret primary legislation compatibly with Convention rights, declare it incompatible or, during EU membership, disapply it. Both systems nonetheless subject executive power to searching review of legality. The paper concludes that the two models are moving towards a shared constitutionalism of legality expressed through different institutional forms. A closing section considers how each model responds to automated decision-making and to emergency governance.

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PERSONAL LAWS VS. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS IN ADVANCING GENDER JUSTICE

PERSONAL LAWS VS. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS IN ADVANCING GENDER JUSTICE Dhriti Kochhar, LL.M. (Criminology), IILM University, Noida (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.182 Indian courts face a difficult challenge: how to balance religious personal laws with the Constitution’s promise of equality and justice for all citizens. This conflict is most visible in women’s rights cases, where religious traditions often deny women equal treatment. Important cases like Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985), Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001), Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), and ongoing cases like Sameena Begum v. Union of India on polygamy and nikah halala show how courts are trying to protect women’s rights while respecting religious freedom. This research uses three methods. First, it studies laws and court judgments to see how judges have dealt with this problem. Second, it compares India with other countries like Islamic nations and the United Kingdom to learn how they handle similar issues. Third, it analyzes whether court decisions actually help women or go beyond what courts should do. The research also looks at the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) case, which says courts must protect the Constitution’s basic principles. The paper argues that while court decisions have pushed for social change and helped women, real progress needs three things working together: courts protecting rights, Parliament making new laws, and society accepting these changes.

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KESAVANANDA BHARATI V. STATE OF KERALA: A LANDMARK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA’S JUDICIAL PROCESS

KESAVANANDA BHARATI V. STATE OF KERALA: A LANDMARK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA’S JUDICIAL PROCESS Akansha Barua , LL.M. (Cyber Law), IILM University, Greater Noida (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.147 The judgment in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) is widely regarded as a turning point in India’s judicial and constitutional history. Delivered by a thirteen-judge bench of the Supreme Court, this case addressed the scope of Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution. The central issue was whether Parliament’s authority extended to altering the very foundation and identity of the Constitution. By a narrow margin of 7:6, the Court propounded the Basic Structure Doctrine, which held that while Parliament has extensive amending powers, it cannot destroy or abrogate the essential features that form the Constitution’s identity. These include the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, judicial review, democracy, secularism, separation of powers, and fundamental rights. This doctrine preserved the sanctity of the Constitution and redefined the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary by establishing the latter as the ultimate guardian of constitutional principles. The judgment was particularly significant during the Emergency period (1975–77), when democratic values and fundamental rights were under threat. It prevented the concentration of absolute power in the hands of transient parliamentary majorities, thereby safeguarding India’s democratic framework. Thus, the Kesavananda Bharati judgment not only curtailed the risks of authoritarianism but also reaffirmed the Constitution as a living document that is flexible yet firmly anchored in its core principles. It remains the cornerstone of Indian constitutional jurisprudence and the defining moment that shaped the future of judicial review and constitutionalism in India.

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BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE- CONSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE- CONSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE Dr Deepakshi Joshi, Principal, Chanakya Law College, Rudrapur, Kumaun University. Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.55 The Supreme Court of India established the Basic Structure Doctrine in the landmark judgment of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala in 1973,[1] Creating a fundamental safeguard that protects the essential features of the Indian Constitution from being altered by parliamentary amendments.¹ This doctrine holds significant constitutional, social, and political implications. From a constitutional perspective, it preserves the Constitution’s fundamental identity by ensuring that core values—such as democracy, secularism, and justice—remain inviolable notwithstanding legislative changes. Socially, it affirms the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, thereby playing a vital role in upholding social justice and equality. Politically, the doctrine strengthens the system of checks and balances through judicial review, thus securing the democratic framework of governance. Overall, this principle has profoundly influenced the shaping of India’s democratic ideals, the protection of individual rights, and the maintenance of the balance of power between the judiciary and legislature.  

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IMPACT ON LAND REFORM LAWS AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE

IMPACT ON LAND REFORM LAWS AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE Meenatchi Priyatharshini R, Student at School of Excellence in Law, Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University, Chennai. Pavithran S, Student at School of Excellence in Law, Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University, Chennai. Download Manuscript ABSTRACT We had Article 31 and 19(1)(g) before the 44th Amendment, which gave the fundamental right to property. This was later on removed by the aforesaid Amendment. Having Article 31, the first Amendment brought in Article 31A and 31B, by which the land reform acts were given protection from the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14 and 19. After the introduction of the doctrine of basic structure, Article 31A and 31B being a part of part III could also be considered as a part of the basic structure. But the very same article gives provisions to override the right to equality and freedom. Isn’t it a clash? This clash was settled by the nine-judges bench by the judiciary. In this article, the constitutional provisions which relates to right to property is discussed along with the impact of the basic structure doctrine in ninth schedule with a jurisprudential point of view. Type Information Research Paper LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, Volume I, Issue IV, Page 277-289. Creative Commons Copyright This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Copyright © LIJDLR 2024 Recent content Author Details (NIKITA AMBWANI & RUPALI CHAUHAN) LAW STUDENTS, UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR Publication Details Volume 1 Issue 1 Year 2022 Published on 01/09/2022

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