LIJDLR

Constitutional amendments

KESAVANANDA BHARATI V. STATE OF KERALA: A LANDMARK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA’S JUDICIAL PROCESS

Volume III Issue IV /

KESAVANANDA BHARATI V. STATE OF KERALA: A LANDMARK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA’S JUDICIAL PROCESS Akansha Barua , LL.M. (Cyber Law), IILM University, Greater Noida (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.147 The judgment in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) is widely regarded as a turning point in India’s judicial and constitutional history. Delivered by a thirteen-judge bench of the Supreme Court, this case addressed the scope of Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution. The central issue was whether Parliament’s authority extended to altering the very foundation and identity of the Constitution. By a narrow margin of 7:6, the Court propounded the Basic Structure Doctrine, which held that while Parliament has extensive amending powers, it cannot destroy or abrogate the essential features that form the Constitution’s identity. These include the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, judicial review, democracy, secularism, separation of powers, and fundamental rights. This doctrine preserved the sanctity of the Constitution and redefined the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary by establishing the latter as the ultimate guardian of constitutional principles. The judgment was particularly significant during the Emergency period (1975–77), when democratic values and fundamental rights were under threat. It prevented the concentration of absolute power in the hands of transient parliamentary majorities, thereby safeguarding India’s democratic framework. Thus, the Kesavananda Bharati judgment not only curtailed the risks of authoritarianism but also reaffirmed the Constitution as a living document that is flexible yet firmly anchored in its core principles. It remains the cornerstone of Indian constitutional jurisprudence and the defining moment that shaped the future of judicial review and constitutionalism in India.

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BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE- CONSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Volume III Issue II /

BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE- CONSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE Dr Deepakshi Joshi, Principal, Chanakya Law College, Rudrapur, Kumaun University. Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2025.v03.55 The Supreme Court of India established the Basic Structure Doctrine in the landmark judgment of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala in 1973,[1] Creating a fundamental safeguard that protects the essential features of the Indian Constitution from being altered by parliamentary amendments.¹ This doctrine holds significant constitutional, social, and political implications. From a constitutional perspective, it preserves the Constitution’s fundamental identity by ensuring that core values—such as democracy, secularism, and justice—remain inviolable notwithstanding legislative changes. Socially, it affirms the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, thereby playing a vital role in upholding social justice and equality. Politically, the doctrine strengthens the system of checks and balances through judicial review, thus securing the democratic framework of governance. Overall, this principle has profoundly influenced the shaping of India’s democratic ideals, the protection of individual rights, and the maintenance of the balance of power between the judiciary and legislature.  

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CONSTITUTIONALISM TOWARD SAFEGUARDING AGAINST ‘ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY’ IN UGANDA: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Volume 1 Issue IV /

CONSTITUTIONALISM TOWARD SAFEGUARDING AGAINST ‘ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY’ IN UGANDA: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE Hanifa Tyakagire, PhD in Law Candidate, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyah of Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia. Shamrahayu A. Aziz, Assoc. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyah of Laws, International Islamic University Malaysia. Download Manuscript ABSTRACT This study aims to discuss constitutionalism as a tool for protecting Uganda from ‘illiberal democracy’. The study examines constitutionalism and its principles on the fate of democracy in Uganda. It offers a valuable constitutional perspective on illiberal democracy while giving insightful viewpoints on how constitutionalism can protect and strengthen democratic systems. Through an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of Uganda’s constitution, this paper seeks to contribute information regarding whether constitutionalism can be a viable approach to limiting government authority in instances where states engage in illiberal democratic practices. The study employs a qualitative research design to explore constitutionalism in Uganda and especially its prevention of ‘illiberal democracy.’ This approach involves the content analysis of judicial opinions as the legal doctrinal research is combined with the applied law methods. This will give a clear and thorough understanding of primary sources, for example, the 1995 Uganda constitution and secondary sources, including research literature and documentary reviews. The findings reveal that illiberal democracy is not committed to the idea of ‘‘checks and balance’’ and, in particular, it maintains four fundamental principles: 1) the limits of governmental power; 2) adherence to the law; 3) protection of individual rights; and 4) preservation of democratic principles and approaches to interpreting the Constitution and is often a threat to constitutionalism. Consequently, the study recommends that changes should be called for through the way in which the Constitution is restored back to its 1995 status or that of the original version, as that would potentially reduce the presidential powers and strengthen provisions such as those regarding age and term limits. In addition, these reforms are in place to create a system conscious of Enlightenment ideas within society. By creating independent institutions to oversee government actions, constitutionalism can ensure that democratic principles are safeguarded against illiberal democracy. Type Information Research Paper LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, Volume I, Issue IV, Page 467-486. Creative Commons Copyright This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Copyright © LIJDLR 2024

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