ONE NATION, ONE ELECTION: REFORMING DEMOCRACY OR CHALLENGING FEDERALISM

The concept of “One Nation, One Election” has become a focal point of India’s electoral reform discourse, promising efficiency, cost reduction, and streamlined governance. Proponents argue that synchronized elections would alleviate the financial burden of recurring polls and reduce policy paralysis caused by the frequent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).

However, this paper critically evaluates these claims, uncovering the economic, constitutional, and socio-political complexities associated with the idea. While the reduction in election-related expenses is a key argument, this paper highlights the hidden costs of implementation, including constitutional amendments, infrastructural investments, and potential disruptions to India’s federal structure.

Moreover, simultaneous elections may lead to governance stagnation, as nationwide enforcement of the MCC could delay critical policy decisions for extended periods. The socio-political implications are equally significant. Synchronizing elections risks overshadowing regional issues and weakening the representation of diverse voices in India’s pluralistic democracy.

This paper explores these concerns while drawing lessons from international practices to propose innovative solutions, such as phased synchronization or hybrid models, to mitigate potential risks. This study ultimately argues that while the idea of “One Nation, One Election” offers administrative and financial efficiency, its impact on federalism, governance, and democratic diversity cannot be overlooked.

A gradual and carefully planned approach, involving robust stakeholder consultation and pilot programs, is essential to balancing the promise of efficiency with the principles of inclusivity and representation. By critically examining these facets, this paper provides a comprehensive foundation for reimagining India’s electoral framework in a sustainable and democratic manner.