Indian federalism, often described as ‘quasi-federal’ or ‘asymmetrical’, is characterized by a constitutional framework that leans towards the Union. A primary instrument of this centralizing tendency is the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule, which delineates subjects where both the Union and the States may legislate. This article critically assesses the functioning of legislative concurrency in India. It argues that the Concurrent List, originally envisioned as a domain for cooperative federalism and legislative harmonisation, has progressively become a mechanism for the Union to assert its legislative dominance, thereby eroding state autonomy. Through an analysis of the constitutional provisions, particularly Article 254, and its judicial interpretation, the article traces the evolution of the doctrine of repugnancy. It contends that the Union’s expansive interpretation of its powers, coupled with a judiciary that has often deferred to Parliament’s legislative intent, has tilted the federal balance significantly. The article examines specific case studies in agriculture, education, electricity, and criminal law to demonstrate how recent Union legislation has encroached upon domains traditionally managed by the states. This trend signifies a shift from cooperative to coercive federalism, raising profound concerns about the viability of India’s pluralistic governance structure. The article concludes by arguing that restoring federal balance requires specific interventions, including empowering the Inter-State Council to mediate legislative disputes, establishing a formal, non-negotiable process for state consent on key concurrent laws, and adopting a judicial review standard that presumes the validity of state autonomy, thereby ensuring the Concurrent List functions as a site of cooperation, not coercion.