In the digital age, access to the Internet has become central to the effective enjoyment of constitutional freedoms and human rights. This paper examines whether Internet access should be recognised as an independent fundamental right or as a derivative right that enables the exercise of existing rights such as freedom of speech and expression, education, privacy, trade, access to information, and democratic participation. The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative legal methodology, relying on constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, international human rights instruments, United Nations resolutions, policy documents, and scholarly literature. It also considers comparative developments in selected jurisdictions to understand how different legal systems have approached digital connectivity and Internet-related rights. The paper finds that although the Indian Constitution does not expressly guarantee a right to Internet access, judicial interpretation has increasingly linked Internet access with Articles 19 and 21. Decisions such as Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala demonstrate that Internet connectivity is constitutionally significant for speech, profession, education, and privacy. At the international level, United Nations human rights standards affirm that rights protected offline must also be protected online and condemn arbitrary disruptions of access to information. The paper further argues that Internet shutdowns must satisfy the tests of legality, necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness. It concludes that meaningful, affordable, and non-discriminatory Internet access is no longer a mere technological convenience but an essential condition for dignity, equality, democratic participation, access to public services, and inclusive development in contemporary modern society.