This paper analyses the profound legal vacuum and structural vulnerabilities embedded in the Indian constitutional framework during a “Hung Assembly.” While Article 164(1) empowers the Governor to appoint the Chief Minister, the text remains entirely silent on the procedure to be followed when an absolute electoral majority is absent. Consequently, this constitutional silence transforms an otherwise formal executive function into an unregulated exercise of “situational discretion.” By critically examining historical and contemporary political crises, including Karnataka 2018, Maharashtra 2019, and Tamil Nadu 2026, this study highlights how the lack of binding law fosters partisan gubernatorial action, encourages unethical horse-trading, and undermines the anti-defection ethos of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.  While judicial interventions most notably the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 established the “floor test” as the definitive laboratory for proving a majority, the initial window of invitation granted by a Governor remains a lawless zone prone to manipulation. Furthermore, this paper evaluates the recommendatory frameworks offered by the Sarkaria Commission (1988) and the Punchhi Commission (2010), contrasting their lack of statutory teeth with the urgent necessity for a codified, binding instrument of instructions. Using a doctrinal and analytical research methodology, this paper argues that relying on unwritten constitutional conventions is no longer sustainable in India’s highly fragmented, multi-party federal polity. Ultimately, the study concludes with an actionable legislative proposal to formally codify the order of preference for government formation, thereby safeguarding democratic legitimacy from executive overreach.