The accelerating development of neurotechnology encompassing Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs), neural implants, deep brain stimulation systems, and brain-signal decoding algorithms poses transformative yet profoundly disruptive challenges to the conceptual architecture of criminal law. The doctrines of mens rea, voluntary conduct, and individual culpability have historically presupposed an autonomous mental agent whose cognitive processes remain unmediated by external technological intervention. Contemporary neurotechnology undermines this presupposition by enabling real-time recording, computational interpretation, and deliberate modulation of neural activity fundamentally destabilizing the causal relationship between cognition and conduct upon which criminal accountability is premised. This article advances two interrelated arguments. First, Indian criminal jurisprudence, primarily codified in mid-nineteenth-century legislative instruments, lacks adequate doctrinal mechanisms to adjudicate liability in circumstances involving technologically induced neural compromise. Second, mental privacy is conceived as the right to cognitive sovereignty over one’s thoughts, neural data, and mental states must be recognized as a constitutionally distinct fundamental right that transcends conventional informational privacy, extending protection to the neurobiological substratum of consciousness itself. Through systematic doctrinal analysis of criminal law principles and constitutional jurisprudence, the article identifies critical lacunae in existing legal frameworks and articulates a normative model for the attribution of criminal liability in cases of technologically mediated cognition. The study contributes original scholarship to Indian legal literature by rigorously situating neuro-rights within the constitutional framework of dignity, liberty, and autonomy, offering a prospective model essential to preserving the moral integrity of criminal justice in the neurotechnological era.