REGULATION OF BID-RIGGING IN GOVERNMENT TENDERS UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

This paper examines the regulation of bid-rigging in government tenders under the Competition Act, 2002. Bid-rigging represents a particularly harmful anticompetitive practice that undermines the integrity of public procurement processes in India. The research analyzes the statutory framework established by Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act, which creates a rebuttable presumption of appreciable adverse effect on competition for bid-rigging arrangements. The paper explores various forms of bid-rigging including cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation, and market allocation. It examines landmark cases establishing jurisprudential standards for detection, proof, and penalties in bid-rigging enforcement. The Competition Commission of India’s evolving role in both enforcement and advocacy is critically assessed, highlighting investigative techniques and remedial approaches. Despite significant regulatory progress, challenges persist including detection difficulties, evidentiary hurdles, and resource constraints. The paper compares India’s approach with international best practices, identifying opportunities for enhancing regulatory effectiveness through criminal sanctions, specialized detection systems, and enhanced prevention mechanisms.