LIJDLR

Volume IV Issue III

FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Volume IV Issue III /

FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS Gursimar Kour Sudan, 1st-Semester LL.M. Student at Lovely Professional University, Punjab (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.329 Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), a form of automated identification based on biometric facial data, has become an important tool of State surveillance in modern times. Its use raises constitutional concerns because the collection, analysis and identification of a person’s face by State authorities may interfere with the right to privacy. This paper conducts a comparative constitutional study of India, the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa to examine the permissible limits of State use of FRT. The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative methodology by analysing constitutional provisions, judicial decisions and relevant legislation in the four jurisdictions. The Indian analysis centres on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India [(2017) 10 SCC 1], which recognises privacy as a fundamental right and applies proportionality to evaluate State action. This framework is compared with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and R (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police [[2020] EWCA Civ 1058], Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Section 14 of the South African Constitution. The paper compares the requirements of legality, legitimate State purpose, necessity, proportionality, equality and safeguards against arbitrary surveillance. It finds that while all four jurisdictions recognise protection against State interference with privacy, they differ in constitutional basis, judicial oversight and legal safeguards for technologically assisted surveillance. The Indian constitutional framework provides a basis for scrutinising FRT, but clearer procedural protections and stricter legality and proportionality standards are necessary to define the permissible limits of State use of facial recognition.

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SERVITUS HUMANITATIS: BRIDGING THE REMEDIAL GAP IN CROSS-BORDER HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

Volume IV Issue III /

SERVITUS HUMANITATIS: BRIDGING THE REMEDIAL GAP IN CROSS-BORDER HUMANITARIAN RELIEF Oghenevwede Donatus Ovwoshokpite, Alumnus, Rivers State University, Rivers State (Nigeria) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.328 Armed conflict frequently produces civilian starvation, medical deprivation and restricted access to essential relief. International humanitarian law permits impartial humanitarian actors to offer assistance, but cross-border relief ordinarily remains conditioned on the consent of the territorial State or the parties concerned. The difficulty arises where consent is refused or delayed without lawful justification while civilians remain in urgent need. This article adopts a doctrinal legal method, examining treaty rules, customary international humanitarian law, judicial authority, United Nations practice and secondary rules on State responsibility. It considers five possible legal bases for overcoming obstructive refusal: the consent framework under humanitarian law, Security Council authorisation, necessity under Article 25 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, abuse of rights and the relevance of peremptory norms, particularly where starvation is used as a method of warfare. The article finds that each basis performs an important but limited function. Humanitarian law restricts arbitrary withholding of consent but does not itself create a general right of territorial entry. Security Council authorisation may permit cross-border relief, but its availability depends on political agreement. Necessity is exceptional and temporary, while abuse of rights and peremptory norms may establish wrongfulness without supplying a complete operational remedy. The article therefore identifies a remedial gap between the illegality of arbitrary refusal and the absence of a standing, non-forcible access mechanism. It proposes Servitus Humanitatis as lex ferenda: a treaty-based regime allowing strictly humanitarian, non-forcible and time-bound cross-border access after independent verification. The proposed Independent Humanitarian Arbitrariness Verification Commission would assess urgency, arbitrariness, alternatives and safeguards before relief proceeds.

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THE VOID MARRIAGE AND THE INVISIBLE WIDOW: RE-EXAMINING SUCCESSION RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN VOID MARRIAGES

Volume IV Issue III /

THE VOID MARRIAGE AND THE INVISIBLE WIDOW: RE-EXAMINING SUCCESSION RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN VOID MARRIAGES Anubha Shukla, 3rd year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.327 The legal consequences of a marriage void under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are ordinarily determined by the absence of valid marital status. A woman whose marriage is void under Section 11 does not acquire the status of a legally wedded wife and, upon the man’s death, cannot ordinarily claim the status of a widow or qualify as a Class I heir under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Although this position accords with the statutory scheme, it has serious economic implications where the woman entered the relationship in good faith, contributed to the household, bore children and became substantially dependent on the relationship. Hindu family law has, however, gradually recognised that the invalidity of a marriage does not necessarily extinguish every legal consequence arising from the relationship. Judicial developments concerning maintenance, permanent alimony, relationships in the nature of marriage and protection against economic deprivation reveal an increasing distinction between formal marital status and substantive economic protection. Against this background, the paper examines whether complete exclusion of a woman in a void marriage from the deceased man’s estate remains justified in all circumstances. The paper argues that a narrowly defined protective entitlement may be considered for women who entered such relationships in good faith and suffered substantial economic dependence, without validating the void marriage or conferring the status of widow. Grounded in justice, equity and good conscience, and informed by constitutional principles of equality, non-arbitrariness and dignity, such protection must preserve the statutory priority of the legally recognised widow and avoid undermining the prohibition against bigamy. The paper therefore proposes a limited distinction between marital status and economic protection to prevent disproportionate economic deprivation in appropriate cases.

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AN EVALUATION OF INDIA’S DIGITAL COMPETITION FRAMEWORK AND THE FUTURE OF EX-ANTE REGULATION

Volume IV Issue III /

AN EVALUATION OF INDIA’S DIGITAL COMPETITION FRAMEWORK AND THE FUTURE OF EX-ANTE REGULATION Harshwardhan Yadav, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Aman Jha, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India). Aditi Raikwar, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India). Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.326 India’s search for a workable model of digital-market regulation has moved through several distinct phases within the space of four years: a parliamentary diagnosis of a regulatory gap, the drafting of an ambitious ex-ante code modelled substantially on the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, and a subsequent pause for evidence-gathering after that code met sustained resistance from both global technology companies and domestic start-ups. This paper traces that trajectory, from the Standing Committee on Finance’s 2022 report on anti-competitive practices by big technology companies through the Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 to the Standing Committee’s own reassessment in August 2025, and situates it against the lived enforcement experience of three comparator regimes: the European Union, the United Kingdom and Germany. Each offers India a different lesson about the costs and benefits of pre-emptive market intervention. The paper argues that the pause announced in 2025 is best read not as an abandonment of ex-ante regulation but as a necessary correction to a Bill that borrowed the European Union’s rulebook without its institutional infrastructure. Drawing on the Competition Commission of India’s expanding ex-post caseload through 2025 and 2026, its cautious market study on artificial intelligence, and the trade-policy backdrop against which digital regulation is now negotiated, the paper contends that India’s future ex-ante framework should be narrower in scope, evidence-led in its thresholds, procedurally safeguarded along German and British lines, and sequenced to work alongside, rather than instead of, a strengthened Competition Act regime. Its proposed model is built around market-specific thresholds, prior hearing safeguards, bespoke conduct obligations, institutional capacity-building, inter-regulatory coordination, and AI-responsive review mechanisms.

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ROLE OF POLICE IN CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA

Volume IV Issue III /

ROLE OF POLICE IN CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN INDIA Ajay Kumar, 4th year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) Student at Amity Law School, Amity University Patna (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.325 The police constitute a central institution in crime prevention and criminal justice administration in India. Their functions extend beyond maintaining law and order to include prevention of offences, registration of information, investigation of crimes, collection and preservation of evidence, protection of victims and witnesses, and assistance to courts in the administration of justice. The historical development of Indian policing is closely connected with the colonial framework established after the Revolt of 1857 and the Police Act, 1861, the influence of which continues to shape several structural and administrative features of police functioning. This paper examines the role of police in crime prevention and criminal justice administration with reference to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, constitutional safeguards, and leading judicial precedents. It analyses the preventive and investigative responsibilities of the police, including registration of information relating to cognizable offences, use of electronic means, search and seizure, forensic evidence, and submission of final reports before competent courts. The paper also discusses the duty of police to protect the rights and dignity of accused persons, victims, witnesses, women, children, and other vulnerable groups. The study further evaluates the growing use of technology in modern policing, including artificial intelligence, CCTV footage, digital forensics, online tracking, cryptocurrency investigation, and data analysis. At the same time, it highlights major challenges such as political interference, shortage of personnel, inadequate training, insufficient infrastructure, and low morale. The paper concludes that effective policing requires a careful balance between crime control and constitutional rights. Police reform, specialised training, technological modernisation, judicial oversight, institutional accountability, and a human-rights-oriented approach are essential for building a professional, transparent, and trustworthy police administration in India.

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OPINION WITHOUT AN OPINION-HOLDER: SECTION 39 BSA, EXPERT EVIDENCE, AND ALGORITHMIC BLACK-BOX TESTIMONY

Volume IV Issue III /

OPINION WITHOUT AN OPINION-HOLDER: SECTION 39 BSA, EXPERT EVIDENCE, AND ALGORITHMIC BLACK-BOX TESTIMONY Samarth Udasin, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Harshwardhan Yadav, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India). Mohit Jain, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.324 Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023 carries forward, almost unchanged, the nineteenth-century architecture of opinion evidence: a person “especially skilled” in a field furnishes the court with reasoned criteria it can independently test. Section 330 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 compounds the difficulty by allowing an expert’s report to be read into evidence, and the expert to go unexamined, unless a party affirmatively disputes it. Both provisions presuppose a human opinion-holder, someone who studied a subject, formed a view, and can defend that view under cross-examination. That presupposition fails when the witness produced in court is a police technician who ran a proprietary facial-recognition or predictive-risk tool without access to its training data, its matching logic, or its validated error rates. This article argues that such testimony is not opinion evidence within the meaning of section 39 at all, but a species of proof Indian evidence law has not yet named. It develops an analytical taxonomy of the opacity such testimony presents, and reads section 39 and section 330 against three comparative bodies of law: the American Daubert–Frye reliability tradition and its confrontation-clause jurisprudence on machine-generated forensic reports; the English common-law presumption that computers operate correctly and its catastrophic failure in the Post Office Horizon scandal; and the European Union’s data-protection and artificial-intelligence law, which increasingly regulates algorithmic opacity before a tool is ever deployed rather than after it produces evidence. The comparative material shows both that mature legal systems have not settled on a common answer, and that each has learned something India can still learn pre-emptively. The article closes with a doctrinal response anchored in the certification model Indian law already applies to electronic records.

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FROM JUDICIAL RECOGNITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL REALISATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MENSTRUAL HEALTH UNDER ARTICLE 21

Volume IV Issue III /

FROM JUDICIAL RECOGNITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL REALISATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MENSTRUAL HEALTH UNDER ARTICLE 21 Yuvika Aswal, 7th Semester B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student at Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University (India) Shirvi Goyal, 3rd Semester LL.B. (Hons.) Student at Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.323 The fact that the right to menstrual health now has a constitutional footing by being brought under the umbrella of Article 21 (the right to life) is revolutionary under Indian constitutional law. In the case of Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors., the Supreme Court addressed menstrual health in the wider context of health, dignity, equality, and access to education and commanded the State to adopt measures for better menstrual hygiene management in educational institutions. In light of the judgment, this paper explores whether the judgment reflects an elaboration of an already existent constitutional right or an extension to the scope of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Using doctrinal as well as comparative research methodology, the paper undertakes analysis of the legal provisions regulating menstrual health and the evolution of the right to health under Article 21 and reviews critically the Court’s judicial approach and argumentation. In addition to analyzing the linkage between Article 21 A (right to education) and menstrual health, the paper sheds light on the problems that poor sanitation for menstrual hygiene causes with regard to educational institutions and the resultant impact on gender equity. The paper endeavors to highlight the emergent understanding of dignified health that the implementation of menstrual leave and menstrual friendly facilities in public institutions displays. Drawing lessons from comparable countries such as Scotland, Kenya, New Zealand and England, the paper points out certain practices which could fortify the legal framework in India. The paper will establish that while the foundation for menstruation was already present in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, it was the judgment which provided clarity regarding the obligations of the State, paving the way for realizing the right to dignified health.

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WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER CANNOT BECOME LAW

Volume IV Issue III /

WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER CANNOT BECOME LAW Professor Om Parkash Wadhwa, Retired Associate Professor of Public Administration at NRS Government (PG) College, Rohtak, Haryana, formerly M.D. University College, Rohtak (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.322 The controversy concerning eligibility for appointment to teaching posts raises an important question of legal authority: can an administrative communication override or enlarge a qualification prescribed by statutory Regulations? The issue assumes particular significance in relation to a UGC communication dated 05.03.1992, relied upon in Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, (2008) 9 SCC 284, concerning the alleged interchangeability of Political Science and Public Administration. The subsequent decision in Ganapath Singh Gangaram Singh Rajput v. Gulbarga University, decided on 1 November 2013, expressly clarified that the Supreme Court had not held Political Science to be the relevant subject for appointment as Lecturer in Public Administration. The documentary record requires a further distinction. Two different UGC communications bear the date 05.03.1992 and arise from different references. One concerns the alleged interchangeability of Political Science and Public Administration; the other concerns teaching/research experience for appointment as Professor. They must not be conflated. The M.D. University Academic Council, by Resolution No. 32 dated 06.06.1992, considered the proposal of interchangeability and resolved that Political Science and Public Administration were separate departments and that teachers should possess the qualifications of the respective discipline. The central argument of this article is that authentication of an administrative communication is not the same as conferring upon it the force of a statutory Regulation. Section 11 of the UGC Act, 1956 concerns authentication of orders and other instruments of the Commission; it does not, by itself, convert every authenticated communication into delegated legislation. Read with Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910, Dr. Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 5 SCC 482, and Ganapath Singh, the principle is clear: academic relationship may be relevant academically, but legal eligibility must ultimately be determined by the competent statutory or regulatory instrument.

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EVALUATING MANDATORY ATTENDANCE IN LAW UNIVERSITIES THROUGH RECENT COURT ORDERS

Volume IV Issue III /

EVALUATING MANDATORY ATTENDANCE IN LAW UNIVERSITIES THROUGH RECENT COURT ORDERS Shlok Kekre, 3rd Year B.B.A LL. B student at Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.321 This paper explores the contentious issue of mandatory attendance in law universities in India. Its focus is on the historical background of the litigation arising from the tragic suicide of a law student and the subsequent judicial scrutiny of attendance norms in legal education. The central research issue concerns the legal challenge to rigid attendance requirements prescribed under the Bar Council of India framework. The paper examines the decision of the High Court of Delhi, its directions to the Bar Council of India, and the further development of the matter before the Supreme Court. In its judgment dated November 3, 2025, the High Court of Delhi departed from a strict attendance-based approach and compared the existing rules with the National Education Policy, 2020 and the relevant UGC framework, both of which contemplate greater flexibility. The Court observed that mandatory attendance may adversely affect practical legal training through moot courts, internships, seminars, court visits, and academic competitions. It directed the BCI to reconsider its regulations and proposed interim safeguards against detention. Subsequently, on May 26, 2026, paragraph 249 was stayed in Supreme Court proceedings arising from NMIMS’s SLP (Crl.) No. 9450/2026, while BCI’s separate petition was heard as a connected matter. By order dated July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court granted one-time relief to students whose academic sessions were ongoing when the High Court judgment was delivered. The matter listed on August 25, 2026 was not taken up and was further listed for September 8, 2026. The paper finally recommends a balanced attendance framework that recognises classroom learning, practical training, and student welfare.

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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN INDIA: REIMAGINING COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Volume IV Issue III /

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN INDIA: REIMAGINING COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE Pragati Sharma, Ph.D Scholar, Netaji Subhash University, Jamshedpur (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.320 Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as one of the most transformative technologies of the twenty-first century, fundamentally altering the manner in which information is created, processed, disseminated, and commercialized. The integration of AI into creative and innovative processes has generated unprecedented opportunities while simultaneously posing significant challenges to traditional legal frameworks governing intellectual property rights (IPR). Existing intellectual property regimes were developed on the assumption that intellectual creations originate from human ingenuity and labor. However, modern AI systems are increasingly capable of generating literary works, artistic content, software code, inventions, trademarks, and digital identities with minimal human intervention. The emergence of generative AI technologies such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, Midjourney, DALL-E, and Stable Diffusion has intensified debates concerning authorship, ownership, originality, inventorship, and liability. These developments have exposed substantial gaps within existing intellectual property legislation across jurisdictions, including India. Courts worldwide are grappling with questions concerning the copyrightability of AI-generated works, the patentability of AI-assisted inventions, trademark misuse through automated digital platforms, and the unauthorized exploitation of personality rights through deepfakes and synthetic media. This article critically examines the intersection between intellectual property rights and artificial intelligence within the Indian legal framework. Through doctrinal and analytical research, it evaluates statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and emerging legal challenges associated with AI-generated intellectual creations. The article further explores comparative approaches adopted in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. It argues that while Indian courts have demonstrated remarkable adaptability in addressing technological disputes, comprehensive legislative reforms are necessary to ensure legal certainty, promote innovation, and protect creators in the evolving digital ecosystem.

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