LIJDLR

Volume IV Issue III

MALICIOUS USE OF DEEPFAKES IN INDIA: LEGAL, TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Volume IV Issue III /

MALICIOUS USE OF DEEPFAKES IN INDIA: LEGAL, TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Adv. Nilam Navanath Pawar, Research Scholar at ABMS Parishad’s Yashwantrao Chavan Law College, Pune, Maharashtra (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.348 The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence has transformed the creation, manipulation and dissemination of audio-visual information. Deepfakes, broadly understood as synthetic or manipulated audio, images and videos capable of presenting fabricated persons, statements or events as authentic, have consequently become a significant legal and socio-economic concern. Although synthetic media has legitimate applications in education, entertainment, accessibility, research and creative expression, its malicious use can facilitate impersonation, financial fraud, defamation, misinformation, electoral manipulation, identity theft, non-consensual intimate imagery and child exploitation. This paper examines a central research question: whether India’s existing legal and regulatory framework adequately addresses the distinct harms caused by malicious deepfakes while preserving constitutionally protected expression. It adopts a doctrinal and analytical approach to the Information Technology Act 2000, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 as amended in 2026, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 19 and 21, and relevant judicial developments concerning personality rights. The analysis finds that India now has an express regulatory framework for synthetically generated information, including intermediary obligations relating to unlawful synthetic content, prominent labelling and technical provenance mechanisms. However, legal protection remains dispersed across criminal, civil, evidentiary, data-protection and sector-specific regimes. Significant gaps persist in relation to electoral deception, cross-border investigation, attribution, authenticity of electronic evidence, rapid victim remedies and the coherent protection of personality rights. The paper therefore argues for a risk-based, harm-oriented and technology-neutral framework that differentiates legitimate synthetic expression from deceptive or malicious uses according to intent, foreseeable harm, scale of dissemination and intermediary involvement.

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN INDIA: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Volume IV Issue III /

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN INDIA: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS Abdul Ashik Mubarak Rawoother, Associate Professor at Al-Ameen College of Law, Karnataka (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.347 Access to justice is a fundamental component of the rule of law and requires justice systems to be accessible, affordable, timely, fair and non-discriminatory. Despite the existence of formal legal institutions, individuals continue to encounter significant barriers arising from the cost of legal services, procedural complexity, delays, geographical constraints, inadequate legal awareness and limited access to legal assistance. In this context, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly emerging as a technological tool capable of transforming the manner in which legal information, assistance and justice services are delivered. AI-enabled legal research, automated translation and transcription, case-management systems, online dispute resolution and chatbot-based legal assistance may facilitate greater accessibility and efficiency within justice systems. However, the integration of AI into justice delivery also presents substantial legal and ethical concerns. Algorithmic bias, inaccurate or fabricated outputs, inadequate transparency, privacy risks, digital exclusion and difficulties in assigning responsibility for AI-generated outcomes may adversely affect equality, due process and public confidence in judicial institutions. These concerns are particularly significant in developing justice systems, where technological inequalities may create new barriers for individuals who are already disadvantaged. This research examines the potential of AI to strengthen access to justice while critically analysing the risks associated with its deployment in legal and judicial processes. It explores whether AI can contribute to a more inclusive and efficient justice system without compromising fundamental rights, judicial independence and procedural fairness. The paper further considers the need for a human-centred and rights-based regulatory framework that places transparency, accountability, human oversight, privacy and non-discrimination at the centre of AI-assisted justice delivery. The study argues that AI should function as a supportive instrument within the justice system rather than replace human legal judgment and institutional accountability.

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PRICED OUT OF PERSONHOOD: HOW DIGITAL MIGRATION REGIMES CONVERT LEGAL RECOGNITION INTO AN ECONOMIC COMMODITY

Volume IV Issue III /

PRICED OUT OF PERSONHOOD: HOW DIGITAL MIGRATION REGIMES CONVERT LEGAL RECOGNITION INTO AN ECONOMIC COMMODITY Sumithra S, 4th-Year B.A. LL.B. Student at Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.346 Digital migration governance utilises data-driven biometric identification systems to govern mobility, work, and access to public resources. While these systems are touted as a method of increasing administrative efficiency, this article contends that these systems serve to facilitate the conversion of migrant legal status into an economic commodity that determines access to economic participation. Legal personhood can no longer be seen as an inherent right, but rather, a condition that is dependent upon data and validated through algorithms. This concept is further developed utilizing a law and economics framework which reimagines legal personhood as an economic infrastructure that determines access to labour markets, access to benefits, and legal protections. This concept is further demonstrated through the operation of digital governance as an economic barrier to economic participation by, for example, excluding migrants that suffer from data poverty or limited forms of recognition which result in lost income, denied benefits, and reliance on precariously informal forms of work. The article also demonstrates the migration of financial risk and administrative costs from the state to migrants, while at the same time the state is extracting economic value from legally unrecognised workers. This article concludes by arguing for a rights-based reimagining of digital migration governance that reinstates the inherent right to legal personhood.

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CYBERCRIME AGAINST WOMEN IN INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, ENFORCEMENT GAPS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Volume IV Issue III /

CYBERCRIME AGAINST WOMEN IN INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, ENFORCEMENT GAPS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE Akshita Dixit, 1st-Semester B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student at The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Gujarat (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.345 The rapid expansion of digital technology has transformed communication, education, employment and social interaction, but it has simultaneously created new spaces for harassment, exploitation and abuse. Women increasingly encounter cyber offences such as cyberstalking, impersonation, identity theft, online harassment, non-consensual dissemination of intimate material, morphing, cyberbullying and other forms of technology-facilitated abuse. The nature of these offences makes them particularly challenging because perpetrators may operate anonymously, evidence can be altered or deleted rapidly, and harmful content can spread across multiple jurisdictions within a short period. This paper examines the Indian legal framework applicable to cybercrime against women and evaluates the extent to which existing laws and institutional mechanisms respond to the distinctive difficulties associated with online offences. It studies relevant provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, together with significant judicial decisions concerning online harassment, privacy, intermediary responsibility and unlawful digital content. The paper further examines institutional mechanisms including the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal and the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre. Particular attention is given to under-reporting, difficulties in identification of perpetrators, preservation and admissibility of electronic evidence, intermediary cooperation, privacy concerns and the emotional and social consequences experienced by victims. The study adopts a doctrinal methodology supported by secondary literature and government materials. It argues that although India possesses several overlapping legal remedies, the framework remains fragmented and its effectiveness depends substantially upon implementation, technological capacity and victim-oriented reporting mechanisms. The paper proposes measures aimed at improving investigation, digital evidence handling, institutional coordination, awareness and access to justice.

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FROM SECTION 80-IAC TO SECTION 140: AN ANALYSIS OF STARTUP TAX HOLIDAYS, ELIGIBILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY IN INDIA

Volume IV Issue III /

FROM SECTION 80-IAC TO SECTION 140: AN ANALYSIS OF STARTUP TAX HOLIDAYS, ELIGIBILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY IN INDIA Vasantha Kirubha R, 2nd-Year LL.M. Student at Hindustan Institute of Technology and Science, Padur, Chengalpattu, Tamil Nadu (India) Dr. Sreeja BG, Associate Professor at Hindustan Institute of Technology and Science, Padur, Chengalpattu, Tamil Nadu (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.344 Innovation and technology can exclusively bring a country development worldwide. In order to encourage innovation, the government usually provides a lot of measures like financial support, subsidies, intellectual protection, supporting R&D and tax incentives for those eligible startups that usually involve innovative new ideas that may generate employment and entrepreneurial ecosystems. An existing company or a heavy background company doesn’t need a push, but a startup may. For supporting those eligible startups in India, one of the principal tax incentives historically available to eligible startups was provided under Section 80-IAC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The tax holiday operates as a profit-linked deduction available to an eligible start-up, which may claim a 100% deduction of the profits and gains derived from its eligible business for any three consecutive tax years, at its option, out of the ten-year period beginning from the year of incorporation under the Income-tax Act. Nonetheless, there was a huge change in the law in 2026. The Income Tax Act of 1961 was abolished from 1 April 2026 onwards, and its relevant startup deduction is now found in Section 140 of the Income Tax Act 2025. In addition, the Finance Act of 2026 changed the turnover limit in Section 140 to ₹300 crore. At the same time, the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), through Notification G.S.R.108(E) dated 4 February 2026 changed the general startup recognition limit to ₹200 crore and introduced a new type of Deep Tech Startup where the limit is ₹300 crore with a recognition period of twenty years. This article discusses the change from Section 80-IAC to Section 140 and evaluates the eligibility criteria, comparing it to the DPIIT criteria as well. The paper also investigates the usability of the tax incentive by discussing the importance of DPIIT recognition, Inter-Ministerial Board certification, and the various guidelines. It is claimed that while the reforms of 2026 significantly update the laws concerning taxation of startups, the gap existing in the formal tax system versus the actual data available on government websites can be a source of confusion. Hence, it is imperative that we increase harmonization of the system, provide updated recommendations, and ease procedures to increase the provision of tax incentives to startups.

FROM SECTION 80-IAC TO SECTION 140: AN ANALYSIS OF STARTUP TAX HOLIDAYS, ELIGIBILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY IN INDIA Read More »

S.S. LOTUS (FRANCE V. TURKEY), 1927

Volume IV Issue III /

S.S. LOTUS (FRANCE V. TURKEY), 1927 Yashika Sonkuusale, 1st-Year Student at Lovely Professional University, Punjab (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.343 The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) case is one of the landmark judgments in international law, concerning the State sovereignty and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The dispute arose after a collision on the high seas between the French vessel Lotus and the Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt on 2 August 1926. The collision caused the Boz-Kourtto sink and resulted in the deaths of eight Turkish nationals. After the Lotus reached Constantinople, Turkish authorities initiated criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons, the French officer who had been on watch at the time of the collision. France objected and argued that only the flag State could exercise jurisdiction. The dispute was later submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). On 7 September 1927, the Court, by the President’s casting vote, held that Turkey had not acted contrary to international law by prosecuting Demons. The Court’s central reasoning was that the effects of the collision occurred on a Turkish vessel and that Turkey was not prohibited by any rule of international law from exercising jurisdiction. The Court also refused to presume restrictions upon the independence of States. This judgment became associated with the Lotus Principle and influenced the proposition that restrictions upon the independence of States must be established by international law. Although the case remains significant, its approach to criminal jurisdiction over high-seas collisions was subsequently limited by treaty law. Article 11 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 97(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) introduced specific rules governing penal or disciplinary jurisdiction arising from collisions and other incidents of navigation on the high seas. This case commentary examines the differing opinions, subsequent treaty developments, the Court’s reasoning, and assesses whether the Lotus Principle continues to influence questions of jurisdiction under international law.

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WHEN DOES INSOLVENCY LAW NUDGE? A MECHANISM-BASED ACCOUNT OF BEHAVIOURAL DESIGN IN INDIA’S INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE

Volume IV Issue III /

WHEN DOES INSOLVENCY LAW NUDGE? A MECHANISM-BASED ACCOUNT OF BEHAVIOURAL DESIGN IN INDIA’S INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE Ayush Verma, 5th-Year B.A. LL.B. Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Atul Wasnik, 5th-Year B.A. LL.B. Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Samyak Raj Nema, 5th-Year B.A. LL.B. Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.342 Scholarship on India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’ or ‘the Code’) routinely describes the statute as an exercise in behavioural design, arguing that its architecture ‘nudges’ debtors and creditors toward cooperative, value-preserving conduct. The claim is rarely tested against what nudge theory actually requires. Because almost every legal rule is meant to change conduct, behavioural influence alone cannot separate a genuine nudge, which works by reshaping choice architecture while leaving the underlying menu of options intact, from an ordinary command, an economic incentive, or a reallocation of institutional authority. This article argues that the failure to draw this distinction has produced an inaccurate picture of how the Code operates and an unreliable method for judging whether its behavioural claims hold up. It develops a two-stage framework, separating the classification of a mechanism from the validation of its effects, and applies that framework to four IBC mechanisms selected because each tests a different form of legal influence: creditor control through the Committee of Creditors, the procedural timelines governing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, the settlement route under section 12A, and the Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PPIRP). The analysis also asks whether a framework built around individual decision-makers can be applied without modification to the institutional actors, banks, committees, insolvency professionals, and tribunals, who actually operate the Code. It finds that most of the Code’s central mechanisms are better explained as institutional redesign or procedural constraint than as choice architecture, that section 12A historically operated differently before and after constitution of the Committee of Creditors, but its substitution in 2026 removed the pre-CoC withdrawal route and converted the current mechanism into a CoC-gated coordination rule, and that PPIRP is best understood as a behaviourally informed institutional mechanism with nudge-like features rather than a pure nudge. The available evidence, drawn from Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India data and recent judicial and legislative developments, supports these classifications more confidently than it supports any claim about demonstrated behavioural effect. The article’s contribution is this framework itself, offered as a tool for evaluating behavioural claims in insolvency law with greater precision than the existing literature allows.

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FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO PUNISHMENT: DIGITAL VIGILANTISM AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL IN INDIA

Volume IV Issue III /

FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO PUNISHMENT: DIGITAL VIGILANTISM AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL IN INDIA Ananya Mishra, Research Scholar at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.341 Digital platforms have expanded the capacity of citizens to expose perceived wrongdoing, mobilise public attention and demand accountability. At the same time, the same visibility can produce forms of informal social control in which public judgement becomes reputational punishment. This article examines the boundary between collective accountability and collective punishment in digitally mediated public life in India. Drawing on qualitative interpretive analysis of scholarly literature and documented cases, it examines the June 2026 death by suicide of Samuel Garvyn De Braganca in Goa following the circulation of a video concerning alleged littering, and the 2026 online-harassment allegations made by Mumbai protester Rhiya Ahir. Rather than treating digital vigilantism as inherently harmful, the article examines the conditions under which citizen-led exposure moves from addressing an alleged act to sanctioning the person associated with it. Becker’s labelling theory and Goffman’s concept of stigma are considered alongside Papacharissi’s concept of affective publics and scholarship on digital vigilantism. The article proposes a trajectory from act to label, identity, reputation and potentially social exclusion. It argues that the boundary between accountability and punishment becomes blurred when rapid visibility, decontextualisation, emotional amplification and disproportionate reputational sanctions converge. Digital vigilantism is therefore approached as a contested form of informal social control whose consequences depend on how information is framed, circulated and acted upon by networked publics.

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ALGORITHMIC BIAS IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA, INDIA AND SELECTED JURISDICTIONS

Volume IV Issue III /

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ALGORITHMIC BIAS IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA, INDIA AND SELECTED JURISDICTIONS Beauty Ilayira, Graduate, Marwadi University, Gujarat (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.340 Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become one of the most revolutionary technologies of the twenty-first century, with increasingly widespread applications across the legal system, including the administration of justice, legal research, law enforcement, judicial decision-making, case management, risk assessment, sentencing, bail determination, and more. Although AI promises to enhance efficiency, consistency, and access to justice, its growing use also raises significant legal and ethical dilemmas, notably algorithmic bias. Algorithmic bias arises when an AI system produces systematically unfair, discriminatory, or inaccurate results because of biased training data, flawed algorithms, human biases, incomplete datasets, or structural inequalities in the society from which the data is sourced. Deploying biased algorithms in legal decision-making is particularly alarming, as the outcomes can directly affect fundamental rights, liberty, equality, privacy, and access to justice. This research explores the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and algorithmic bias in legal decision-making, focusing on Nigeria, India, and selected jurisdictions, including the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. It assesses whether current constitutional, statutory, judicial, and regulatory frameworks can mitigate the risks associated with AI-assisted legal decision-making. The study compares transparency, explainability, accountability, data protection, discrimination, human oversight, and the right to contest automated decisions. It also examines the consequences of algorithmic bias for fundamental rights in the constitutional contexts of Nigeria and India and reviews relevant judicial responses and emerging international regulatory strategies.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ALGORITHMIC BIAS IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA, INDIA AND SELECTED JURISDICTIONS Read More »

REVIVING SECTION 245: ANALYSING THE CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE IN ANKIT JAIN V. JINDAL POLY FILMS LTD.

Volume IV Issue III /

REVIVING SECTION 245: ANALYSING THE CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE IN ANKIT JAIN V. JINDAL POLY FILMS LTD. Sahasra Nellore, 7th-Semester BBA LL.B. Student at O.P. Jindal Global University, Haryana (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.339 Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 lets shareholders and depositors file class action suits before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) when a company’s management acts against their interests. It was introduced after the Satyam scam, based on a recommendation by the J.J. Irani Committee, to give the small shareholders a way to fight back together instead of alone. But for almost ten years after it came into force in 2016, no class action suit under this section was admitted by the NCLT. This was due to the statutory membership and shareholding thresholds, procedural ambiguity surrounding the provision, and the availability of the comparatively familiar oppression and mismanagement remedy under Section 241. This changed in February 2026, when the NCLT admitted India’s first major class action suit under Section 245 in Ankit Jain v. Jindal Poly Films Ltd., a decision later upheld by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). This paper looks closely at that case and how the Tribunals decided it was a class action and not a derivative action. It also looks into how they read the phrase “are being conducted” to cover past transactions, and why they refused to apply foreign tests like the American Tooley test and the English reflective loss doctrine. The paper also compares India’s approach with the US, UK, and Australia. It concludes that while this case is an important step forward, one good ruling is not enough and that India still needs to fix the thresholds and procedure under Section 245 so that ordinary shareholders can actually use it going forward.

REVIVING SECTION 245: ANALYSING THE CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE IN ANKIT JAIN V. JINDAL POLY FILMS LTD. Read More »