LIJDLR

Volume IV Issue III

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVIATHAN: DECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAULT LINES OF INDIA’S ALGORITHMIC AND COERCIVE DIRECT TAX REGIME

Volume IV Issue III /

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVIATHAN: DECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAULT LINES OF INDIA’S ALGORITHMIC AND COERCIVE DIRECT TAX REGIME Indrakshi Saha, 3rd year student at Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar School of Law, Rashtrasant Tukadoji Maharaj Nagpur University (RTMNU), Nagpur (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.359 India’s direct tax administration has, within a few years, acquired three capabilities that were individually unremarkable but are jointly formidable: algorithmic selection of cases for reassessment (sections 273 and 281 of the Income-tax Act 2025, formerly sections 144B and 148A of the Income-tax Act 1961), forensic access to the digital lives of taxpayers during search (section 247, formerly section 132), and pre-adjudicatory attachment of bank accounts and other property (section 500, formerly section 281B). This paper asks whether the procedural convergence of these powers, left without statutory safeguards, offends the constitutional guarantees of Articles 14, 20(3), 21, 19(1)(g) and 300A, and how it fares against the standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the emerging law on automated decision-making. Using a doctrinal-comparative method, the paper argues that the strongest constitutional objections lie not in the existence of these powers but in their design: unpublished risk criteria, the absence of independent control over the acquisition and retention of digital material, and the absence of proportionality limits on freezing orders. It also confronts the weight of adverse authority, from Pooran Mal to R K Garg, and explains why the new jurisprudence on proportionality and informational privacy permits a principled departure from fiscal exceptionalism. It notes that in March 2026 the Supreme Court declined to entertain a challenge to the search power, disposing of the petition as withdrawn with liberty to represent to the Government and without ruling on the merits, which strengthens rather than weakens the case for a legislative solution. The paper concludes with a legislative blueprint comprising a Digital Search Protocol, an algorithmic transparency mandate and substantive guardrails for provisional attachment.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEVIATHAN: DECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAULT LINES OF INDIA’S ALGORITHMIC AND COERCIVE DIRECT TAX REGIME Read More »

PRE-LITIGATION MEDIATION IN INDIA: ACCESS TO JUSTICE OR AN ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL BARRIER?

Volume IV Issue III /

PRE-LITIGATION MEDIATION IN INDIA: ACCESS TO JUSTICE OR AN ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL BARRIER? Rishita Kumre, 5th year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Vanshika Sharma, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.358 India has spent two decades trying to move disputes out of overloaded courts and into consensual processes. That effort has gone through three phases. Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 introduced court-annexed referral to alternative dispute resolution. Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act 2015 then made pre-institution mediation a precondition to filing most commercial suits. The Mediation Act 2023 followed, adopting a consent-based default for civil disputes while the proviso to section 5(1) preserves the compulsory commercial gateway. This paper traces that trajectory and asks whether compulsory pre-litigation mediation advances access to justice or adds a procedural hurdle that delays vindication of rights. It situates India against two comparators, England and Wales and Italy, and against a domestic comparator, the pre-litigation conciliation conducted by Permanent Lok Adalats. The paper argues that the legitimacy of mandatory mediation depends on design rather than principle. Compulsion is defensible where the process is time-bound, inexpensive, institutionally staffed and leaves urgent relief untouched. It is indefensible where it operates as a ritual gateway. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Patil Automation, Yamini Manohar, Dhanbad Fuels and Novenco, the paper proposes a calibrated model built around consent-sensitive gateways, a narrow and well-defined urgency exception, a mediator-capacity guarantee, cost and delay safeguards, a clear relationship between section 12A and the Mediation Act 2023, and evidence-led review through public data.

PRE-LITIGATION MEDIATION IN INDIA: ACCESS TO JUSTICE OR AN ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL BARRIER? Read More »

GREEN AGREEMENTS VS. CARTEL PROHIBITION: NAVIGATING THE INTERSECTION OF SUSTAINABILITY GOALS AND COMPETITION POLICY

Volume IV Issue III /

GREEN AGREEMENTS VS. CARTEL PROHIBITION: NAVIGATING THE INTERSECTION OF SUSTAINABILITY GOALS AND COMPETITION POLICY Harsh Vardhan Singh, B.A.LLB (Hons.)/4th Year Student at National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal (India) Shreay Agarwal, B.A.LLB (Hons.)/4th Year Student at National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal (India) Kriti Sharma, Bsc.LLB (Hons.)/4th Year Student at National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.357 Climate change is a collective action problem that individual firms cannot solve alone, yet the most natural corporate responses, such as jointly phasing out polluting inputs or adopting common sustainability standards, resemble the output restrictions and horizontal agreements that competition law forbids. This paper examines that tension, which it calls the ‘green paradox’: the risk that rigorous cartel enforcement suppresses the private climate action that public policy seeks to encourage. It reviews the responses of the European Commission, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets and the UK Competition and Markets Authority, focusing on ‘out-of-market’ benefits and their quantification, and contrasts them with the United States, Germany, Austria, Japan and Australia. It then turns to India, whose Competition Act 2002 has no dedicated sustainability framework but contains textual hooks, namely the joint-venture proviso to section 3(3), the efficiency factors in section 19(3) and the exemption power in section 54, which a purposive reading could activate. The paper argues that accommodation of green agreements remains incomplete in every jurisdiction examined, and proposes a graduated framework of official valuation benchmarks, rebuttable presumptions and time-limited exemptions, adapted to Indian institutions.

GREEN AGREEMENTS VS. CARTEL PROHIBITION: NAVIGATING THE INTERSECTION OF SUSTAINABILITY GOALS AND COMPETITION POLICY Read More »

FACIAL RECOGNITION, PROTEST ATTENDANCE AND INFERRED POLITICAL AFFILIATION: INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND STATE SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA

Volume IV Issue III /

FACIAL RECOGNITION, PROTEST ATTENDANCE AND INFERRED POLITICAL AFFILIATION: INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND STATE SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA Aditi Raikwar, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Rishita Kumre, 5th year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Vanshika Sharma, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.356 Facial recognition has moved in India from pilot projects to routine policing without a statute that says when, against whom, and for what purpose a face may be scanned. This paper examines what that gap means when the face belongs to a person attending a political protest. Attendance at a demonstration is a public act, but the record of who attended, kept by the State and matched against police databases, becomes a durable data set from which political affiliation can be inferred, whether or not the police intend to infer it. The paper builds its argument around the events at Jantar Mantar in July 2026, when the Delhi Police deployed a facial recognition system during the student agitation led by the Cockroach Janta Party over the NEET-UG paper leak, reported that it had matched 2,873 people against its criminal records, and defended its conduct before the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court. It traces the litigation that followed, including the surveillance petition before the Delhi High Court, the petitions against the police action of 20 July before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court’s order of 1 September 2026, and it records what each court said and what each court left open. It then compares India with the European Union, the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights, each of which has treated protest-site biometric identification as a distinct problem. The paper contends that the Indian position is not a case of unlawful technology meeting a silent Constitution, but of a settled constitutional standard under Puttaswamy meeting an administrative practice that has never been tested against it. It proposes a narrower and sequenced framework built around a dedicated statute, prior authorisation, a bar on inference of political belief, independent oversight, auditable accuracy standards, and protest-specific rules on retention and notice.

FACIAL RECOGNITION, PROTEST ATTENDANCE AND INFERRED POLITICAL AFFILIATION: INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND STATE SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA Read More »

CAN A CERTIFICATE DECIDE THE TRUTH? SECTION 65-B AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AFTER POORANMAL

Volume IV Issue III /

CAN A CERTIFICATE DECIDE THE TRUTH? SECTION 65-B AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AFTER POORANMAL Aditi Raikwar, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Himanshu Kamlesh Mishra, 5th year B.Sc. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Harsh Chawla, 5th year BA. LL.B. (Hons.) [Cyber Security] Student at National Law Institute University, Bhopal (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.355 Indian courts have spent more than a decade insisting that a printed call record, a chat export or a video file is not evidence until a certificate says it is. The rule, traced to Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 and now carried into Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, was restated by the Supreme Court in Pooranmal v State of Rajasthan in March 2026. There, call detail records were excluded and a murder conviction was set aside because the prosecution had not proved the certificate and had relied instead on the oral testimony of telecom nodal officers. This paper uses that decision as a vantage point to ask what the certificate can and cannot do. It argues that the certificate is a gatekeeping device for admissibility and a weak proxy for authenticity, and that Indian law has asked more often whether the paperwork was completed than whether the record can be trusted. Tracing the line of authority from Navjot Sandhu through Anvar, Shafhi Mohammad and Khotkar, the paper examines the legislative reworking of the certificate in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, including the hash value and the expert’s declaration, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pune Bar Association v Union of India upholding that design in May 2026. It then tests the regime against the problems of access, forensic capacity, custody and synthetic media. The paper proposes a calibrated model built around early certification at source, a statutory chain-of-custody code, funded access to expert certification for indigent accused, a preserved judicial power to cure defects, and a clear separation between the certificate as a threshold and authenticity as a question of weight.

CAN A CERTIFICATE DECIDE THE TRUTH? SECTION 65-B AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AFTER POORANMAL Read More »

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY: A CRITICAL STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THEORY OF H.L.A. HART

Volume IV Issue III /

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY: A CRITICAL STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THEORY OF H.L.A. HART Mahalakshmi B, Third year student B. ALLB, KMC College of Law, Tiruppur, Affilitated with The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Tamil Nadu (India) Vedhika M, Third year student B. ALLB, KMC College of Law, Tiruppur, Affilitated with The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Tamil Nadu (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.354 This research paper critically examines the relationship between law and morality with special reference to H.L.A. Hart’s positivist theory. The study focuses on Hart’s separation thesis, according to which the existence and validity of law are conceptually distinct from the moral merit of law. It explains Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules, the rule of recognition, the internal point of view, and his minimum content of natural law. The paper then considers Lon Fuller’s response, particularly the inner morality of law and the eight principles of legality, and applies the Hart-Fuller debate to the German ‘Grudge Informer’ case arising from the Nazi period. The analysis also considers objections raised by Ronald Dworkin and John Finnis, together with Joseph Raz’s exclusive-positivist reply, and examines Hart’s later accommodation of moral criteria through the idea of inclusive positivism. The study further considers the relevance of these theories to contemporary constitutional systems, with particular reference to India and the relationship between constitutional validity, fundamental rights, and constitutional morality. The research adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology, relying on primary and secondary legal materials, including Hart’s works, Fuller’s writings, leading jurisprudential scholarship, and relevant case law. The paper finds that Hart does not deny the practical relationship between law and morality; rather, he rejects the claim that moral validity is a necessary condition of legal validity. At the same time, Hart’s minimum content and inclusive positivism demonstrate the practical possibility of moral criteria entering legal systems through accepted legal rules. The paper therefore treats the Hart-Fuller debate as a continuing analytical framework for understanding the distinction and interaction between legality, morality, and constitutional values.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY: A CRITICAL STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THEORY OF H.L.A. HART Read More »

THE DECENTRALISATION PARADOX: COLONIAL LEGACIES AND DECOLONISING THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY IN POST-COLONIAL GOVERNANCE

Volume IV Issue III /

THE DECENTRALISATION PARADOX: COLONIAL LEGACIES AND DECOLONISING THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY IN POST-COLONIAL GOVERNANCE Anurag Nair, B.A.LL.B/5th year/Sem.IX Student at ILNU, Nirma University (India) Saurav, B.A.LL.B/ 5th Year/Sem.IX Student at ILNU, Nirma University (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.353 This study examines why grassroots participation in democracy within post-colonial nations remains unfulfilled, arguing that although the sovereign state displaced colonial rule, it did little to alter the internal state machinery and the administrative framework it inherited. The paper combines Mahmood Mamdani’s bifurcation of the state with the institutional path-dependence models of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, in order to demonstrate how colonial institutions, created as instruments of resource extraction and social control, continue to constrain local autonomy. Treating the “Prefectoral” system, and in particular the long-standing office of the District Magistrate, as the principal obstacle to fiscal and administrative decentralisation, the research identifies a “Decentralisation Paradox”: in the majority of circumstances, modern reform concentrates upon decentralising oppression by empowering local elites rather than the common people. The analysis further employs the concept of state-driven simplification developed by James C. Scott, together with the prestige-based influence exercised within the bureaucratic field theorised by Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, and Samar Farage, so as to emphasise the cultural dimension of bureaucracy as the source of a colonial-like distance separating the administrator from the local citizen. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative, comparative-historical design, examining India and Nigeria as contrasting colonial inheritances: the meritocratic “Steel Frame” of direct administration in the former, and the neopatrimonial order produced by Indirect Rule in the latter. The paper proceeds from the architecture of colonial control, through path dependence and bureaucratic stickiness, state simplification and the legibility gap, to a comparative case study and the paradox itself. It concludes that authentic local democracy requires a decolonisation of the bureaucracy, which at present continues to treat local populations as subjects to be distrusted rather than as citizens to be trusted.

THE DECENTRALISATION PARADOX: COLONIAL LEGACIES AND DECOLONISING THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY IN POST-COLONIAL GOVERNANCE Read More »

GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW: CHALLENGES IN DETERMINING AUTHORSHIP AND OWNERSHIP

Volume IV Issue III /

GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW: CHALLENGES IN DETERMINING AUTHORSHIP AND OWNERSHIP Joylin Jacob Y, Research scholar in Bharath Institute of Higher Education and Research at school of law/ Assistant Professor in St. Joseph University, School of Law (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.352 Generative Artificial Intelligence (Generative AI) has transformed the creation of literary, artistic, musical, dramatic and audiovisual works. Unlike conventional computer-assisted creativity, Generative AI systems independently produce sophisticated outputs after processing vast datasets and responding to human prompts. This development challenges copyright law at its foundation, because traditional regimes are constructed around a human author, originality, ownership and exclusive rights. The central legal question is whether an output generated substantially or entirely by an AI system attracts copyright and, if so, who is to be recognised as its author and owner. The difficulty intensifies where the user supplies only a prompt, where the user undertakes extensive creative selection and modification, or where the system autonomously produces the final expression. The Copyright Act, 1957 contains no dedicated framework for Generative AI, although Section 2(d)(vi) on computer-generated works, Section 13 on subsistence, Section 17 on first ownership and Sections 18 and 19 on assignment supply the governing principles. The order of the Registrar of Copyrights of 31 August 2026 in the DABUS matter holds that an artificial intelligence system, having no legal personality, cannot be the statutory author, although its output may satisfy originality. The United States requires human authorship, the United Kingdom protects computer-generated works by statute, and the European Union regulates providers of general-purpose AI models through copyright and transparency obligations. This paper examines the Indian framework and the relevant comparative developments, the first Indian judicial ruling on model training, and the contemporary controversies concerning authorship, ownership, training data, infringement and accountability. It argues that neither unrestricted copyright for autonomous AI outputs nor the complete exclusion of AI-assisted works is adequate. A human-centred but technology-neutral framework, supported by disclosure requirements, provenance mechanisms, licensing systems and legislative clarification, is necessary to balance technological innovation against the legitimate interests of human creators.

GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND COPYRIGHT LAW: CHALLENGES IN DETERMINING AUTHORSHIP AND OWNERSHIP Read More »

DECONSTRUCTING THE CARCERAL STATE: EVALUATING RESTORATIVE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE MECHANISMS IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF INDIA AND LIBERIA

Volume IV Issue III /

DECONSTRUCTING THE CARCERAL STATE: EVALUATING RESTORATIVE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE MECHANISMS IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF INDIA AND LIBERIA Sam Siryon, Law Student, School of Legal Studies, Apeejay Stya University – Gurgaon (India) Dr. Manju Rani, Assistant Professor, School of Behavioral Sciences, Apeejay Stya University – Gurgaon (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.351 Modern criminal justice systems face severe criticism for perpetuating structural inequality, protecting the wealthy, and controlling surplus labor, Gilmore, Ruth Wilson (2007). By criminalizing poverty and minor offenses, these systems create a permanent underclass that feeds the private prison industry and provides cheap inmate labor. Prison abolitionists argue that carceral systems cannot be truly reformed because they are inherently rooted in brutality, control, and historic frameworks of racial and economic oppression, Davis, Angela Y. (2003). Furthermore, when criminal justice relies solely on punitive measures and deterrence, its purpose becomes anchored in brutality and recidivism. While a system based on proportional punishment claims to provide a formal framework for accountability and restore moral balance, it ultimately satisfies a public desire for retribution without addressing the root causes of crime or rehabilitating offenders, Mathiesen, Thomas (1974).  To address these shortcomings, this study presents a cross-jurisdictional analysis of the criminal justice systems in India and Liberia. Adopting a comparative research methodology, this paper analyzes international legal instruments, judicial precedents, and domestic legislation to argue for an integrative approach that prioritizes corrective mechanisms, reform, and social reintegration. By dissecting legal frameworks, correctional mechanisms, and the balance between victim-offender reforms and state sovereignty, the study highlights a stark divergence. It finds that India’s transition from the colonial-era Indian Penal Code to a justice-oriented framework under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, represents a significant step toward a restorative justice model. Conversely, the Liberian Criminal Procedure Code reveals statutory stagnation, contrasting sharply with the modern legislative intent demonstrated by India’s BNS. 

DECONSTRUCTING THE CARCERAL STATE: EVALUATING RESTORATIVE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE MECHANISMS IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF INDIA AND LIBERIA Read More »

THE LAW WE FEAR, THE LAW WE BELIEVE: WHAT REALLY CONTROLS US?

Volume IV Issue III /

THE LAW WE FEAR, THE LAW WE BELIEVE: WHAT REALLY CONTROLS US? Mahalakshmi B, Third Year student B.A.LL.B., KMC College of Law, Tirupur, Affiliated with The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Tamil Nadu (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.350 The question of why people should obey the law remains one of the central and continuing problems in jurisprudence and political philosophy. Obedience raises not only the question whether a rule is legally valid, but also whether citizens owe a moral duty to follow it. This paper examines why people obey law by separating legal validity from moral obligation. The paper discusses the major theories that have attempted to explain why people obey the law, including natural law, social contract theory, utilitarianism and legal positivism. It gives particular attention to H.L.A. Hart’s theory of legal obligation, especially his distinction between being “obliged” and being “under an obligation”, the internal point of view, and the practice theory of rules. Hart connects legal obligation with the acceptance of rules as standards of conduct within a legal system, yet he does not argue that a valid law automatically creates a moral duty to obey it. The paper then considers Hart’s idea of the minimum content of natural law and its practical importance for maintaining social order, security and cooperation. It examines the views of Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller to show different approaches to legal authority, legality and fidelity to law. The paper finally addresses the difficult issue of civil disobedience, particularly where valid laws are regarded as unjust. The examples of Gandhi’s Salt Satyagraha and Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil rights movement demonstrate that obedience to law may come into conflict with moral conscience. The paper concludes that no single reason applies in every situation, and that the duty to obey law depends upon the relationship between legal validity, social order, moral responsibility and the principles of justice.

THE LAW WE FEAR, THE LAW WE BELIEVE: WHAT REALLY CONTROLS US? Read More »