PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY LIMITS
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY LIMITS Mr. Aritra Saha, Student, SOA National Institute of Law-Faculty of Legal Studies, Siksha ‘O’ Anusandhan Deemed to be University, (India) Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.22 This paper explores the constitutional parameters of parliamentary privileges in India, their development and limitations focusing especially on Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution. The origins of these privileges go back to British tradition of parliamentary independence and were designed to protect the independence of legislature and prevent closed debate in Parliament. Nonetheless, as opposed to the British concept of parliamentary sovereignty, Indian privileges take place in an order of constitutional supremacy, judicial review and fundamental rights. Through examining landmark cases like MSM Sharma vs Sri Krishna Sinha, the current study traces the transformation of the judiciary whereby in early days; there was a deference form of judgement, but gradually the judiciary has changed into a model of conditional oversight based on the basic structure doctrine. It critically explains the tensions that exist between parliamentary privileges and fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21 and there is also the structural ambiguity that occurs in the non-codification of Articles 105(3). This paper presents that even though privileges are essential in the safeguarding of the deliberative democracy and the dignity of the institutions, they are not absolute; they must not be outside the constitutional boundaries, fairness in the procedures, and proportionality. The study therefore comes to the finding that legislative independence must be balanced with the rule of law and governmental accountability through statutory codification and better procedure protection.