RULE-MAKING POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN THE PHILIPPINES: A DOCTRINAL REASSESSMENT IN THE CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY STATE
RULE-MAKING POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN THE PHILIPPINES: A DOCTRINAL REASSESSMENT IN THE CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY STATE Darren Javier Gonzales, Associate Dean, John Wesley School of Law and Governance, Wesleyan University-Philippines Reena Clarisse Aviñante Carlos, Associate Professor, John Wesley School of Law and Governance, Wesleyan University-Philippines Lyndon John Santiago De Leon, Associate Professor, John Wesley School of Law and Governance, Wesleyan University-Philippines Download Manuscript doi.org/10.70183/lijdlr.2026.v04.05 Administrative agencies occupy a central position in contemporary governance, exercising extensive rule-making authority that significantly shapes rights, obligations, and regulatory outcomes. In the Philippines, this authority derives from legislative delegation and is constitutionally constrained by the principle that legislative power is vested in Congress. This Article undertakes a comprehensive doctrinal reassessment of the quasi-legislative, or rulemaking, powers of administrative agencies in the Philippine legal system. Anchored on the 1987 Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and authoritative Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Article examines the constitutional foundations, evolution, scope, and limits of delegated administrative rulemaking. Particular emphasis is placed on the non-delegation doctrine and its judicial articulation through the completeness and sufficient-standard tests as mechanisms for preserving legislative supremacy while accommodating the functional necessities of administrative governance. The Article further analyzes substantive and procedural constraints on administrative regulations, including the ultra vires doctrine, the categorical prohibition against administrative penal legislation, publication requirements grounded in due process, and the standards governing judicial review of administrative rules. It highlights the Supreme Court’s calibrated approach to administrative deference, which accords respect to technical expertise while applying heightened scrutiny where regulations impose penal consequences or implicate fundamental rights. Situating Philippine doctrine within a comparative administrative law framework, the Article draws descriptive insights from the United States and the United Kingdom as mature regulatory systems confronting similar tensions between delegation and accountability. It argues that while Philippine administrative law reflects a coherent constitutional framework, it remains under-theorized in light of the expanding regulatory state. Greater doctrinal synthesis and clearer judicial articulation are therefore necessary to sustain the constitutional legitimacy of administrative rulemaking in the Philippines.